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COPYRIGHT’S TECHNO-PESSIMIST CREEP
Xiyin Tang*
Government investigations and public scrutiny of Big Tech are at an
all-time high. While current legal scholarship and government focus have
centered overwhelmingly on whether and how antitrust law and § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act can be revised to address platform dominance,
scant attention has been paid to another, almost unseen attempt to regulate
Big Tech: copyright law. The recent adoption in Europe of Article 17 of the
Copyright Directive, which holds internet platforms liable for
user-generated creative content unless they obtain costly content licenses, is
the most direct example of such regulation—and may serve as precedent for
similar changes to U.S. law. Meanwhile, before the courts and in the
executive branch, copyright holders are increasingly harnessing anti–Big
Tech sentiment to advocate for everything from weakening fair use doctrine
to terminating long-standing government oversight of certain concentrated
content holders.
As recent scholarship laments the role that copyright minimalism played
in the meteoric ascent of large technology platforms, this Article argues that
increasing copyright protection will not combat monopolies. The seemingly
compelling public narrative that laws must be rewritten to combat power by
any means necessary ignores the uniqueness of copyright markets as ones
dominated not by diffuse, weak licensors bargaining with technology giants,
but instead by large, oligopolistic content conglomerates. Changes in
copyright laws that increase the cost of content licenses fail to address, and
indeed will only enrich, the long-standing dominance of traditional content
licensors. They will also entrench and concentrate licensees, creating a
bilateral oligopolistic market for copyrighted works. And such changes will,
ultimately, hasten the obsolescence of the very content industries that
advocated for these reforms, as today’s licensees evolve to become
tomorrow’s licensors. This Article concludes that to fight monopoly, to be
truly neo-Brandeisian, one must think beyond copyright law.
* Assistant Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. For helpful comments on earlier drafts,
my thanks to Barton Beebe, James Boyle, Anupam Chander, Julie Cohen, Jeanne Fromer, Jill
Horwitz, Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman, Jessica Litman, Mark McKenna, Neil Netanel, Jim
Park, Kal Raustiala, Julia Reda, Kirk Stark, Andrew Verstein, Jacob Victor, and the
participants at the Yale Law School Virtual Cyber Policy Series, the 2020 Intellectual Property
Scholars Conference, the 2020 Works-in-Progress Workshop, the Junior Law and Tech
Scholars forum, the UCLA Law School Junior Scholars Workshop, and the Hofstra Law
School Intellectual Property Colloquium. Elizabeth Anastasi provided superb research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
By many accounts, we are living in a new Gilded Age. Large technology
platforms, perhaps touted a decade ago as agents of change and
democratization,1 have now found themselves increasingly under scrutiny,
1. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (discussing the internet’s potential
to create new freedoms for making and exchanging “information, knowledge, and culture”).
Importantly, the same champions for how the internet could democratize content distribution
away from a handful of intermediaries for purposes of copyright law were notably less
enthusiastic about the internet’s overall liberating force for democracy. The same champions
who extolled “remix culture” were the ones who were most skeptical of what James Boyle
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both by governments around the world and in the court of public opinion.2
As Senator Elizabeth Warren put it: “Today’s big tech companies have too
much power—too much power over our economy, our society and our
democracy.”3 In this Article, I refer to this general sentiment—that Big Tech
has become all-imposing, all-dominating, omnipotent, and omnipresent—as
“techno-pessimism.” Of course, the two most prominent legal areas in which
this battle has played out are antitrust law4 and § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996,5 the latter of which has repeatedly found itself in the
national spotlight, especially after Twitter and Facebook permanently banned
Donald Trump from their platforms following the Capitol riot.6
calls “digital libertarianism”—letting the internet proceed apace without any government
intervention. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997) (arguing that digital libertarianism is
inadequate because it enables private entities to engage in damaging acts of censorship and
surveillance and because it allows states to do the same). Or, as Lawrence Lessig, whose
name has become synonymous with “remix culture,” put it: “How do we protect liberty when
the architectures of control are managed as much by the government as by the private sector?”
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE xv (2006).
2. By one account, “[n]early two-thirds of Americans would support breaking up tech
firms by undoing recent mergers, such as Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram . . . .” Emily
Stewart, Poll: Two-Thirds of Americans Want to Break Up Companies Like Amazon and
Google, VOX (Sept. 18, 2019, 10:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/
9/18/20870938/break-up-big-tech-google-facebook-amazon-poll [https://perma.cc/GMX376EB]. While I use the term “techno-pessimism,” the swing toward tech-negativity also has
been broadly referred to by the popular press, and adopted by technology law scholars, as a
“techlash.” See Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Fair Learning, 99 TEX. L. REV. 743, 747
n.24 (2021) (citing Rachel Botsman, Dawn of the Techlash, GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2018,
7:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/11/dawn-of-the-techlash
[https://perma.cc/7PAA-NYYN] (“Once seen as saviours of democracy, tech giants are now
viewed as threats to truth.”)); Gregory Bobillot, ‘Techlash’—How Big Tech Is Influencing
Your Thinking, FIN. TIMES (May 10, 2018), https://www.ft.com/video/3339f59e-f760-4bc7b359-3899fabbd190 [https://perma.cc/G6PV-78DC] (describing how too much time spent on
social media can wreak havoc on your mental state); Eve Smith, The Techlash Against
Amazon, Facebook and Google—And What They Can Do, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-techlash-against-amazon-facebookand-google-and-what-they-can-do [https://perma.cc/HQF7-MVJ5] (describing a $2.7 billion
fine from the European Commission against Google for privacy violations and how the 2020
U.S. presidential candidates were all running on anti-tech platforms); The Techlash Has Just
Begun, AXIOS (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.axios.com/the-techlash-1515609266-e27ca2990031-460a-96f1-db842ec88121.html [https://perma.cc/PU53-5XTV] (“The high-profile fight
against big tech companies is just beginning, and it’s happening in response to crises over fake
news, tech addiction and data security.”).
3. Lauren Gambino, ‘Too Much Power’: It’s Warren v Facebook in a Key 2020 Battle,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2019, 8:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/19/
elizabeth-warren-facebook-break-up [https://perma.cc/F24N-BTV6].
4. See generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE
(2018) (arguing that antitrust laws should return, or pivot, to a “Neo-Brandeisian Agenda,” in
turn subjecting tech companies like Amazon and Google to common carrier regulation).
5. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560–561 (1996). Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 immunizes internet platforms from liability resulting from the activities and speech
of its users, so that a platform like Facebook will not be treated as the speaker for purposes of
tort or criminal liability. See id. § 230.
6. See Vivek Ramaswamy & Jed Rubenfeld, Editorial, Save the Constitution From Big
Tech, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2021, 12:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/save-theconstitution-from-big-tech-11610387105 [https://perma.cc/Y6TT-4A9F] (arguing that § 230
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This Article focuses on a different, unexamined, and unexpected area in
which the law is subtly shifting to regulate the dominance of Big Tech:
copyright.
Of course, copyright law has long been an unanticipated nexus in which
debates about technology, innovation, and disruption have played out.7 The
traditional content industries—Hollywood, record labels, and book
publishers—have never liked new technological entrants, be it the printing
press, the VCR, or YouTube, and they’ve frequently invoked copyright law
to protect their interests.8
But while this fundamental antagonism and tension have stayed the same,
the animating force behind it, the rhetoric, and the normative emphasis have
changed. Traditional content industries are no longer confined to the typical
argument that, if left unchecked, the printing press, the VCR, or streaming
services pose an existential threat that will ultimately signal the death of
creative production as we know it—an argument that has not borne out in
history. Now, the new technology wars seem to signify something deeper,
more ominous:
if left unchecked, copyright minimalism—roughly
corresponding to broader users’ rights like fair use or broad liability shields
like safe harbor laws—could threaten democracy as we know it, entrenching
power, cementing inequality, and shielding market forces from the political
process.9 This line of thought has been helped along by law and political
economy scholarship, which has pointed to “copyleft” arguments and “other
progressives skeptical of strong intellectual-property law . . . [as] help[ing to]
further” antiregulatory ideals cloaked behind the veil of innovation policy—
ideals that led to Google’s meteoric ascent.10
And thus, because copyright laws passed or developed at the infancy of
the internet, such as § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act11
(DMCA) or the fair use doctrine, have allowed companies like Google to
flourish, perhaps it is time to peel back these laws.12 Meanwhile, before the
courts and the legislature, powerful, well-organized content holders, such as
music publishing, record label, and software corporations, are harnessing just
“not only permits tech companies to censor constitutionally protected speech but immunizes
them from liability if they do so”).
7. See generally Mark Lemley & Mark McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 100 B.U. L. REV.
71 (2020). As the U.S. Supreme Court put it in a case involving the novel (at the time) VHS
player: “From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant
changes in technology.” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
430 (1984).
8. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7, at 74–75.
9. See Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460,
1493 (2020); see also Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law-and-Political-Economy
Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1784, 1803 n.68,
1804 (2020) (noting that “Google was a great driver and recipient of” the expansion in fair use
doctrine, which in turn “set the stage for today’s extraordinary forms of platform power”).
10. Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 1493; see also id. at 1494 (arguments for the value of
user-generated content “proved perfectly compatible with the emergence of platforms,
including those like Google that offer much for free”).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 512; see infra Part I.A.
12. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
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this type of argument to advocate for the weakening of the fair use doctrine,
the termination of long-standing antitrust oversight of certain concentrated
content holders, and an explicit license-or-staydown regime for technology
platforms.13
This Article argues that reshaping copyright in the anti-monopoly spirit
will in fact have the exact opposite effect. The seemingly compelling public
narrative that laws must be rewritten to combat power by any means
necessary ignores the uniqueness of copyright markets as one dominated not
by diffuse, weak licensors bargaining with technology giants, but instead by
large, oligopolistic content conglomerates. Changes in copyright laws that
increase the cost of content licenses not only fail to address, and indeed will
only enrich, the long-standing dominance of traditional content licensors.
They will also entrench and concentrate licensees, creating a bilateral
oligopolistic market for copyrighted works. And such changes will,
ultimately, hasten the obsolescence of the very content industries that
advocated for these reforms, as today’s licensees evolve to become
tomorrow’s licensors.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of
the copyright laws, both statutory and common law, that proved deeply
beneficial for growing internet companies, including the enactment of § 512
of the DMCA, the expansion of the fair use doctrine, and certain consent
decrees governing the musical performing rights organizations, such as the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) (a
performing rights organization that administers licenses on behalf of its
songwriter-members)14 and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).
Part II looks at how our present era’s techno-pessimism has begun
reshaping both the law and the rhetoric of our current copyright battles,
beginning with the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market in
Europe, which could serve as precedent for the United States’s own revisions
of § 512, and the techno-pessimist rhetoric that is being harnessed by content
holders in the courts and before the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to fight
continuing regulation of concentrated content industries.
Part III argues that, to the extent these new laws are rooted in antitrust-like
arguments premised on Big Tech’s market power, they obscure the history
of copyright ownership as one dominated by a few oligopolistic content
companies. Today, upstream competition amongst licensors has further
decreased, as the large content conglomerates have become even more
concentrated. Meanwhile, downstream competition is increasing, as the cost
of distributing content decreases and traditional content creators are
increasingly becoming distributors.
Part IV argues that using copyright law to address Big Tech dominance
will have the opposite effect, creating a market dominated by a few
entrenched, concentrated licensees negotiating with a few entrenched,
13. See infra Part II.
14. See We Are ASCAP, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/ [https://perma.cc/9234-FY32]
(last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
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concentrated licensors—a bilateral oligopoly. In the final analysis, the more
difficult and costly licensing creative content becomes, the more likely that
technology companies will innovate around the problem, ultimately
rendering traditional content production companies obsolete. To fight
monopoly, to be truly neo-Brandeisian, one must think beyond copyright
law.15
I. THE COPYRIGHT LAWS THAT SHAPED TECH
The best-known contemporary example of the law that built the internet is
most likely § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which largely
immunizes internet platforms from tort liability resulting from content posted
by its users.16 Indeed, in his book The Twenty-Six Words That Created the
Internet, Jeff Kosseff argues that “[i]t is impossible to divorce the success of
the U.S. technology sector from the significant benefits of Section 230.”17
What § 230 does not address, however, are instances in which the content
posted by a user results in copyright infringement liability.18 But a law
passed at the same time as § 230 did just that—serving as § 230’s copyright
corollary.19 This part first discusses the so-called “safe harbor” provision in
U.S. copyright law and then discusses several other laws that proved
beneficial for the growth of new technologies.
A. Section 512 Safe Harbor
Congress passed the DMCA to implement the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.20 Among the DMCA’s provisions
was § 512, often referred to as the “safe harbor.”21 Like § 230 did with user
speech that may have resulted in tort liability, the § 512 safe harbor shields

15. While some scholars have linked earlier arguments for less intellectual property
protection to the enablement of platform power, such accounts largely ignore the fact that
copyright transactions necessarily will enrich one corporate power, whether it is a technology
platform licensee (who may, through safe harbors, potentially be able to shield itself from
copyright liability) or a content holder licensor (who may, through its own market power,
demand supercompetitive license fees). See infra Part III. In so doing, these accounts refuse
to take a broader view of corporate power, concentrating instead on a handful of large
technology firms, while failing to explain how, and if, the alternative to less protection will
somehow lessen sources of power rather than, as I argue here, simply further entrench it.
These critiques at times lament the expansion of intellectual property rights as empowering
corporate rightsholders and privileging neoliberalism’s calls for greater internalization at the
expense of consumers, while in other places arguing that a “minimalist” approach to
intellectual property enabled “the development of troubling forms of private power.”
Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 1494.
16. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
17. JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 205 (2019).
18. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 512; infra Part I.A.
20. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001)).
21. Id. at 27.
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internet platforms from copyright liability as a result of infringing content
uploaded by its users, provided certain conditions are met.22
Section 512’s legislative history acknowledges both the importance of a
safe harbor for user freedom of expression and the prevention of internet
platforms from being exposed to crippling infringement liability for the
enormous amounts of data being transmitted or posted on their sites on a
daily basis. “In the ordinary course of their operations,” Senator Orrin Hatch
reasoned, “service providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them
to potential copyright infringement liability.”23 Thus, Senator John Ashcroft
stated, “The notion that service providers should not bear the responsibility
for copyright infringements when they are solely transmitting the material is
one key to the future growth of the Internet.”24 A safe harbor allows the
internet to “flourish,”25 while simultaneously ensuring that internet users’
“freedom of expression” is not “impinged upon.”26 “In short, by limiting the
liability of service providers, the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the
Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services
on the Internet will continue to expand.”27
Notably, in passing the DMCA, Congress had considered—and
specifically rejected—the content industry’s request that internet services
instead go out and get licenses for the content its users made available on
their sites. Performing rights organizations such as ASCAP, which controls
a large portion of performance rights in copyrighted musical compositions,
specifically advocated for a licensing regime instead of a safe harbor,
proposing that licensing would provide a workable middle ground to the
“[safe harbor] legislation or [copyright infringement] lawsuit[]” dilemma
Congress intended to address with § 512.28 But as congressional testimony
by licensees demonstrated, licensing all the content made available on a
service provider’s platform was simply unworkable. Notably, while certain
types of licenses were available on a “blanket” basis (for example, one
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement
of copyright by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for,
material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider . . .
if . . . the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a person other than
the service provider . . . .”).
23. 144 CONG. REC. 9234–35 (1998) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (explaining the need
for and negotiations surrounding limits on online service provider liability).
24. Id. at 9238 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft) (explaining that he pushed to address
service provider liability in order to allow the internet to grow).
25. Id. at 25,811–12 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (expressing satisfaction that the
current version of the bill achieves balance between copyright holders and service providers).
26. Id. at 18,771 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank) (noting that this solution helps balance
the rights of copyright holders and service providers).
27. See supra note 23.
28. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability
Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Cts. and Intell.
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, H. Reps., 105th Cong. 185–86 (1st Sess. 1997)
(testimony of John Bettis, Songwriter, ASCAP Board of Directors) (debating whether a
blanket license would be a workable alternative to judicial or legislative solutions to the
problem of service provider liability).
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license with ASCAP would grant a service provider all public performance
rights for those musical works in ASCAP’s repertoire), many other
copyrighted works—or even specific types of rights, such as the right to
synchronize a musical composition with a film—would need to be licensed
on an individual, work-by-work basis.29 Thus ultimately, and likely to the
chagrin of the content industries, a licensing regime was rejected in favor of
a safe harbor that exempts online service providers from infringement
liability for the content made available by its users.
After its passage, § 512 proved vital in the fortunes of several technology
platforms. Most notable among these is Google, which was sued by Viacom
in 2007 for infringing content made available on YouTube (which Google
had acquired) by YouTube users.30 The copyright owners had demanded
statutory damages for “approximately 79,000 audiovisual ‘clips’ that
appeared on the YouTube website between 2005 and 2008.”31 Because a
court may, in its discretion, award statutory damages of up to $150,000 per
copyrighted work,32 Viacom was, in theory, entitled to over ten billion
dollars in damages.33 At the time the lawsuit was brought, Google’s profits
across all its divisions (not just YouTube, which had been pulling in
approximately fifteen million dollars in revenue, but not profits),34 while
quite high, had only been a little over one billion dollars.35 A damages award
that granted the copyright owners all that they were seeking would have
potentially bankrupted Google alone, to say nothing of its one video-sharing
division, YouTube.36 The resulting litigation, which lasted for seven years,
ended in the district court finding in favor of YouTube based on § 512.37
29. National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearing on
S. 1284 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 15–16 (2d Sess. 1996) (response
of Creative Incentive Coalition) (explaining why a blanket license would be unworkable).
30. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012).
31. Id. at 26.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
33. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 26; see also Second Amended Class Action
Complaint ¶ 151, Football Ass’n Premier League v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 159
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 07-cv-3582), 2008 WL 5596002 (seeking statutory damages “in the
maximum amount permitted by law with respect to each work infringed”).
34. See Michael Arrington, YouTube Revenues: $15 Million Per Year, or Per Month?,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 6, 2007, 4:02 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2007/03/06/youtuberevenues-15-million-per-year-or-per-month/ [https://perma.cc/N5XC-E4PK].
35. See Miguel Helft, Google Profit Up 46%, Exceeding Estimates, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/18/technology/18google-web.html
[https://perma.cc/65F2-QQ76].
36. A copyright damages verdict in the billions is not simply farfetched conjecture, nor
should we expect a jury or a judge to exercise restraint in such awards. For example, a jury
recently awarded a coalition of Big Content music industry copyright owners one billion
dollars in damages against the service provider Cox Communications—$99,830.29 for each
work infringed, multiplied by a little over 10,000 works infringed—a paltry number compared
to the number of works alleged in Viacom Int’l, Inc. See Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Commc’ns,
No. 1:18-CV-00950, 2021 WL 1254683, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2021).
37. See Viacom Int’l., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
While § 512 undoubtedly provided a defense, and some bargaining leverage, to platforms
hosting user-generated content, it is far from an absolute shield for copyright liability. As I
discuss in Part IV, far from allowing technology platforms to act as havens for wanton piracy,
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While the Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. litigation is the most
well-known example of how instrumental § 512 proved to be to internet
platforms, it is certainly not the only one. Other popular internet video
platforms, such as Veoh and Vimeo, were also able to rely, with varying
degrees of success, on the § 512 safe harbor to defend against copyright
infringement claims brought by content companies.38 As Professor Matthew
Sag wrote, “[t]he DMCA safe harbors have been a tremendous benefit to the
U.S. copyright system and to the U.S. economy . . . . [T]he internet safe
harbors have propelled the growth of social networking and other ‘Web 2.0’
businesses.”39
Content holders, unsurprisingly, were vocal about their hatred of the safe
harbor and issued existential warnings about the coming death of culture in
the face of the internet. The president of then–Time Warner warned that the
coming of the Internet Age would result in a “sort of cultural Dark Ages.”40
Of course, these dire predictions were the same type of apocalyptic
proclamations that the content industry would issue with any new
technology, including the advent of the videotape.41 The debates
surrounding the safe harbor and its importance to internet companies merely
served as an exemplar for, and microcosm of, the content industries’
long-standing antagonism to technological disruption.
Of course, just as content did not die with the videotape, it did not die with
the growth of the internet. Not only did private bargaining for copyright
licenses continue under the DMCA, but culture also thrived, rather than
the reality is that technology platforms, including YouTube, have nonetheless chosen (or,
more likely, as a result of the uncertainty of continued safe harbor litigation) to enter into
negotiated license agreements with content holders in the shadow of the DMCA. See infra
Part IV.
38. See Capitol Recs., LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 99 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that
the video-sharing platform Vimeo is eligible for safe harbor protection and thus is not liable
for copyright infringement committed by its users); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap.
Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1013, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the video-sharing
platform Veoh is entitled to rely on § 512’s safe harbor and thus was not liable for copyright
infringement of Universal Music Group’s copyrighted sound recordings).
39. Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 504–05 (2017).
40. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 151 (2001) (noting that the president of Time
Warner stated: “This is a very profound moment historically. This isn’t just about a bunch of
kids stealing music. It’s about an assault on everything that constitutes the cultural expression
of our society. If we fail to protect and preserve our intellectual property system, the culture
will atrophy. And corporations won’t be the only ones hurt. Artists will have no incentive to
create. Worst-case scenario: The country will end up in a sort of cultural Dark Ages”).
41. See id. at 106. As Jessica Litman details, the executive secretary of the American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists had testified before a House subcommittee in 1982
on the perniciousness of the first sale doctrine, which shielded videotape rental businesses
from copyright liability:
Unless we do something to ensure that the creators of the material are not exploited
by the electronics revolution, that same revolution which will make it possible for
almost every household to have an audio and video recorder will surely undermine,
cripple, and eventually wash away the very industries on which it feeds and which
provide employment for thousands of our citizens.
Id. at 106–07.
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receding into the predicted Dark Ages as a result of online piracy conducted
under the cloak of safe harbor laws. Movie industry revenues rose.42
Creative output increased: the number of films, books, and music available
to U.S. consumers has grown exponentially, not decreased, since the
enactment of the safe harbor.43 And many of these changes were helped
along in significant part by technology.44 Sites like YouTube and Twitch are
producing new revenue streams for audiovisual content. Empirical studies
from the past decade show remarkable increases in not just industry revenue
(as opposed to the precipitous declines and mass layoffs portrayed by content
industries),45 but also in the quantity, quality, and diversity of cultural output
being produced (lest anyone believe that the growth of the internet has merely
resulted in a world awash in mediocrity—or, as one commentator put it, “No
more Hitchcocks, Bonos,46 or Sebalds.”47).48
B. ASCAP/BMI Consent Decrees
Whereas technology platforms governed by the § 512 safe harbor relied on
user-generated content, other internet platforms—what I will call “mass

42. See JOEL WALDFOGEL, DIGITAL RENAISSANCE: WHAT DATA AND ECONOMICS TELL US
ABOUT THE FUTURE OF POPULAR CULTURE 73–105 (2018).
43. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act at 22: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Subcomm. On Intell. Prop., 116th Cong. 1 (2020) (statement of Professor
Rebecca Tushnet).
44. See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 486–87
(2015) (providing evidence that content industries have seen increased revenues and that more
content is being created in the new Internet Age).
45. See Copyright Law in Foreign Jurisdictions: How Are Other Countries Handling
Digital Piracy?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Intell. Prop.,
116th Cong. 1 (2020) (statement of actor Jonathan Yunger) (“For the past two decades, the
plague of digital piracy has been stealing jobs from hardworking Americans. The truth is that
the battle against piracy has only intensified since the DMCA became law . . . . Anything that
could be distributed digitally online was stolen and monetized by criminals, facilitated by
some of the world’s wealthiest Internet companies including Google, its now-sibling
YouTube, and Facebook.”); Andrew Keen, Why We Must Resist the Temptation of Web 2.0,
in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 51, 54 (Brian Szoka
& Adam Marcus eds., 2011) (“Newspapers are in freefall . . . . Meanwhile, digital piracy,
enabled by Silicon Valley hardware and justified by [Silicon Valley] intellectual property
communists such as Larry Lessig, is draining revenue from established artists, movie studios,
newspapers, record labels, and songwriters.”).
46. It is not entirely clear to this author whether Bono belongs in the pantheon of great
culture.
47. See supra note 46.
48. Keen, supra note 45, at 55; see WALDFOGEL, supra note 42, at 163 (concluding that
we are experiencing a digital renaissance in books, film, music, and television) (“In music, the
number of new songs released annually has tripled, and top-selling lists are made up
increasingly of songs from artists on independent labels . . . . By some counts, the number of
movies produced annually has increased by a factor of ten. The annual number of new releases
that are commercially available has increased by a factor of roughly five. Independent movies
make up a growing and large share of the critical darlings; and the number of critically
acclaimed movies—for example, those scoring above 90 at Rotten Tomatoes—has grown
from 10 to 100 per year.”); see also GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND
MUSIC IN THE US RECORDING INDUSTRY 158 (2018) (finding that more revenue to the music
industry in fact results in fewer and lower-quality hit songs).
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aggregation” technologies—could not rely on the § 512 safe harbor because
the platforms, not the users, controlled the content.49 I refer to these as “mass
aggregation” technologies because these innovations aggregate existing
copyrighted content—text, images, music—to make the world’s culture
instantly and easily accessible. For example, Google Books does this with
text. Google Image Search does this with images. And Pandora and Spotify
do this with music. But the strength of these services—making available vast
quantities of text, images, or music—is also its very weakness as far as
copyright law is concerned.
A federal district court noted in a royalty rate dispute involving the digital
radio service Pandora and copyright holder ASCAP that “the internet has
enabled providers to present listeners with a vast library of radio
programming, the likes of which has never been available before.”50 “With
the internet, each listener’s device gets its own data stream, in contrast to the
broadcasting of a common signal across a geographic area,” as would be the
case with AM/FM radio.51 Pandora’s particular innovation in generating
unique radio “stations” for each of its users was its Music Genome Project
(MGP).52 Pandora had substantially invested in the MGP, hiring “[t]rained
music analysts, many of whom have music related degrees or are musicians,
[to] listen to the compositions . . . and register the composition in reference
to as many as 450 characteristics.”53 Thus, Pandora users “seed” a station
with a song, artist, genre, or composer that they enjoy, and Pandora then
“draws upon the MGP to locate other compositions that the listener is likely
to enjoy.”54
Just like traditional radio stations, Pandora needs a license in order to
publicly perform copyrighted musical works. Due to the sheer number of
songs that radio stations—to say nothing of digital radio stations like
Pandora—have on rotation, performing rights organizations (PROs) like
ASCAP offer “blanket licenses” that give licensees the right to perform all
of the works in the PRO’s repertoire.55 As Judge Ralph K. Winter of the
Second Circuit has noted, blanket licenses are efficient because they “reduce
the costs of licensing copyrighted musical compositions. They eliminate
costly, multiple negotiations of the various rights . . . . They also allow users

49. See 17 U.S.C. § 512. Section 512 only provides that “service provider[s] shall not be
liable for monetary relief . . . for infringement of copyright” for material stored or routed
through their servers if “the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of
a person other than the service provider.” Id. § 512(a)(1).
50. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2015).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 327.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 322.
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of copyrighted music to avoid exposure to liability for copyright
infringement.”56
But for the same reasons that blanket licenses are efficient, the
consolidation of so many musical works also presents serious
anticompetitive concerns.57 Thus in 1941, the DOJ brought antitrust suits
against both ASCAP and the other largest PRO, BMI.58 As a result of these
lawsuits, BMI and ASCAP entered into consent decrees with the DOJ, which
imposed certain limitations on both PROs.59 For example, the ASCAP
decree subjects the PRO to the jurisdiction of certain “rate courts” sitting in
the Southern District of New York so that licensees may apply to the rate
court to determine a reasonable fee in the event an agreement cannot be
reached between the parties.60 Likewise, and critically for companies like
Pandora, the decree requires ASCAP to grant licenses on demand “to any
music user making a written request therefor a non-exclusive license to
perform all of the works in the ASCAP repertory.”61
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the consent decrees were unpopular with licensors
for the same reason they are popular with licensees. Music publishers, who
are members of the PROs, had to grant licenses to anyone who requested
one—and, in particular, they had to grant them to technology companies like
streaming services. Thus, in 2010, ASCAP and its large music publisher
members, like Sony Music Entertainment, began to pursue a strategy known
as “partial withdrawal,” where the publishers would withdraw from ASCAP
the right to license works to so-called “new media” users.62 This meant that
“new media” services—and only new media services (like Pandora)—would
no longer be able to take advantage of ASCAP’s blanket license and would
have to begin individually negotiating licenses with each copyright holder
instead. In other words, the very efficiencies of blanket licensing that gave
56. Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917,
934 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., concurring).
57. See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. MobiTV, Inc., 681 F.3d 76,
82 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “ASCAP, as a monopolist, exercises market-distorting power
in negotiations for the use of its music”).
58. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1940–43 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1940–43 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,098 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). The consent decrees have been modified throughout
the years. The current governing versions of the consent decrees are Second Amended Final
Judgment, United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395,
2001 WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001) [hereinafter ASCAP Amended Judgment] and
Amended Final Judgment, United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64 Civ. 3787, 2000 WL
280034 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter BMI Amended Judgment].
59. See ASCAP Amended Judgment, supra note 58; BMI Amended Judgment, supra note
58.
60. See ASCAP Amended Judgment, supra note 58, at *6–8.
61. Id. at *4; see also id. at *7 (providing that, in the event the parties cannot agree upon
a reasonable fee for the license, “the music user shall have the right to perform any, some or
all of the works in the ASCAP repertory to which its application pertains, without payment of
any fee or other compensation” while pending rate court review).
62. See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2015).
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rise to licensing collectives like ASCAP in the first place would be
unavailable to new technologies.63
Pandora sought relief in the rate court, arguing that the consent decrees
prohibited partial withdrawal and seeking the determination of a reasonable
royalty fee in lieu of what it argued was a far-above-market rate reached
outside the protections of the consent decrees.64 Judge Denise L. Cote held
that the consent decrees prohibited publishers from “partially withdrawing”
their works.65 In other words, either publishers could engage in direct
licensing negotiations with every licensee—whether that be a restaurant or
Pandora—or, if publishers wished to take advantage of the collective
efficiencies of ASCAP, then they needed to comply with the provisions of
the consent decrees, including their all-comers provisions.66
The district court further found that the benchmark rates negotiated with
Sony and Universal Music Group, which were negotiated outside of the
protection of the consent decrees, were not competitive, fair market rates.67
The district court had previously defined fair market value as a license fee
arrived at in an arm’s length transaction.68 Both ASCAP and Pandora agreed
on a definition of fair market value, defining it as the rate “at which a willing
and unrelated buyer would agree to buy and a willing and unrelated seller
would agree to sell . . . when neither party is compelled to act, and when both
parties have reasonable knowledge of the relevant available information.”69
The reasonable fee that the district court itself set after extensive fact-finding,
1.85 percent of Pandora’s revenue, was far lower than the market-negotiated
rates of 3.42 percent (Universal) and 2.28 percent (Sony).70 Describing the
rate drop of over 50 percent from the rate Sony and Universal were able to
obtain by partial withdrawal, the court noted: “ASCAP did not show that the
upshot of the negotiations conducted by either Sony or [Universal’s
publishing arm] with Pandora was a competitive, fair market rate.”71 In other
words, the court took seriously the music publishers’ threat that they had the
power to “shut down” Pandora72—and viewed this as evidence that so-called
63. See Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d
917, 934 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., concurring).
64. In re Pandora Media, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 8035, 2013 WL 5211927, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
17, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015).
65. Id. at *11.
66. Id. at *1.
67. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. at 357–58.
68. Id. at 353 (citing Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. MobiTV, Inc.,
681 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2012)).
69. Id. at 354 (alteration in original) (citing ROBERT W. HOLTHAUSEN & MARK E.
ZMIJEWSKI, CORPORATE VALUATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE 4–5 (2d ed. 2014)).
70. Id. at 372. The court described the rate Universal had negotiated for itself as a
“leap . . . so astounding that it drove Pandora to buy a radio station and to file a summary
judgment motion challenging the legality of” partial withdrawal. Id. at 360–61 (emphasis
added).
71. Id. at 372.
72. Id. at 359 (describing Pandora as having “three options: shut down its business, face
crippling copyright infringement liability, or agree to Sony’s terms” (citation omitted)).
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“marketplace” negotiations conducted outside the protections of the consent
decrees were anything but fair.
But with new changes brought about by the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte
Music Modernization Act73 (MMA), passed in 2018, as well as changes
likely to come to the consent decrees, Judge Cote’s opinion will likely be
remembered as a vestige of a different era.74 Whereas changes brought about
by the MMA will almost certainly result in rate courts handing down higher
royalties,75 changes to the consent decrees, discussed in Part II, could mean
that digital services no longer get the benefit of blanket licenses at all.
C. Fair Use
Perhaps the best known of all of copyright’s defenses, fair use allows
others to use copyrighted works—without payment to or permission from
copyright holders—in certain instances, “such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”76 As the doctrine
developed in the common law, “courts consistently expressed preference for
secondary uses that did not merely copy and offer themselves as substitutes
for the original copyrighted text,” but instead that used copyrighted works in
the creation of new works—what Judge Pierre N. Leval called “productive”
uses.77 “[R]eproductive” uses, or ones where the copyrighted work was
merely copied for some other purpose or in some other medium, were
disfavored.78
Of course, most cases79 in which new technologies reproduced
copyrighted works were by nature ones where reproductive, rather than
productive works, were at issue. New technologies, such as the VCR, the
photocopier, the internet search engine, and the computer, may have changed
the way that a copyrighted work was viewable, searchable, or transmitted,
but they did not use copyrighted works in the creation of new, creative
expression.

73. Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 17, 19, and 28 U.S.C.).
74. See infra Part II.B.
75. See infra Part II.B.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 107. As Neil Netanel pointed out to me in an email, language from the
House report suggests that § 107 may have been contemplated to extend to new technologies
like Google Books or Google Image Search. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“The
bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid
technological change.”).
77. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 11, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(“Texaco’s copying is not of the transformative, nonsuperseding type that has historically been
favored under the fair use doctrine.”).
78. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1114–16
(1990).
79. But not all. Notably, new technologies also enabled users to cut, copy, and paste
copyrighted works like digital bricolage, incorporating them into their own creative
expression. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016). Often, these
cases were decided, at least in part, on the basis of the § 512 safe harbor.
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But fair use proved to be an important nexus in which the age-old battle
between content owners and new technologies played out. As Justice John
Paul Stevens put it in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,80
the first new technology case that put fair use to the test, “[f]rom its
beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant
changes in technology.”81 But, as Justice Stevens pointed out, courts had
historically been deferential to Congress when evaluating new technological
innovations that fundamentally change how copyrighted materials are
consumed, sold, or transmitted.82 The subsequent decision in Sony Corp. of
America, then, was remarkable in nonetheless applying the judicially
developed fair use doctrine to hold that home taping of copyrighted materials
on VCRs for purposes of “time shifting” (fast forwarding) constituted fair
use.83
Sony Corp. of America may have been the first decision to apply fair use
to a new technology’s reproduction of a copyrighted work, but it was not the
last. Two notable fair use decisions involving Google applied the doctrine to
hold that both mass aggregation and mass digitization of copyrighted
works—again, without payment and without a license—could be permissible
under copyright law.84 The first, a 2007 Ninth Circuit decision, involved
Google Image Search.85 Google’s Image Search functionality returns
thousands of thumbnail images from all over the web in response to user
queries.86 Many of these thumbnails may be of copyrighted images.87
Notably, Google did not hold a license from any of the copyright owners who
held rights in the images.
The Ninth Circuit determined that Google’s Image Search functionality
constituted a fair use.88
“Google’s use of thumbnails is highly
transformative,” the court held, noting that the functionality provided a great
benefit to the public by creating an “electronic reference tool” for images.89
Critically, the fact that Google also profited off Image Search through the use
of targeted advertising did not outweigh the “significantly transformative
nature of Google’s search engine, particularly in light of its public benefit.”90
The Ninth Circuit’s fair use finding was in effect a zero-fee compulsory
license to Google.91 This finding was critical to Google Image Search’s

80. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
81. Id. at 430.
82. Id. at 431.
83. Id. at 454–55.
84. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 229 (2d Cir. 2015); Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
85. See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1155 (explaining the mechanics of Google Image
Search).
86. See id. at 1155.
87. See id. at 1157.
88. Id. at 1168.
89. Id. at 1165.
90. Id. at 1166.
91. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-But-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1383, 1385 (2014) (noting that in cases such as Perfect 10, Inc., “the user is not only
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continued viability, and not just because a finding of infringement would
have entitled the rightsholder to seek injunctive relief.92 Even if a court chose
to deny injunctive relief, as it is permitted to do after the Supreme Court’s
ruling in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,93 Google would be vulnerable
to infringement lawsuits from every single rightsholder whose image appears
in the Google Image Search functionality—which is to say, Google would
have been subject to, quite literally, millions of infringement lawsuits.94
Several years after the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc.,95 the Second Circuit issued its own fair use finding on
another Google technology, Google Books.96 Google Books was a mass
book digitization project that Google launched in connection with several
major research libraries.97 In connection with the project, Google scanned
over twenty million books in order to create its electronic database.98 On top
of that, Google made this database text-searchable.99 Users of the tool can
search the entire library and view excerpts, or snippets, from these books—
including from books that had long gone out of print.100
dispensed from obtaining permission, but also owes no compensation for the use”). And a
compulsory license is just that: the rightsholder does not have the right to say “no.”
92. For further reading about the problem of fair use as an “on/off switch” in which a
finding that a use is not fair would entitle a “copyright owner [to] stop the use,” see id. at 1385.
93. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). eBay Inc. held, in the patent context, that injunctions should not
automatically be granted once infringement is found. Id. at 394. Courts have subsequently
applied eBay Inc. to copyright infringement lawsuits, as well. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting,
607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
94. See Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 198 (2007) (noting that Google Books, if it lost the fair use defense,
would be liable for up to 300 billion dollars in statutory damages). Note that Perfect 10 made
its images available through a password-protected portal. See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at
1157. These images were not included in Google Image Search; rather, the images at issue
were those made available by third-party websites that had republished Perfect 10’s images
without its authorization. See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1157. Perhaps this suggests that
some sort of opt-in/opt-out system could be created in which copyright holders who do not
want their content made available on Google Image Search could simply protect their content
via password protection, as Perfect 10 had done. Those copyright holders who do not similarly
lock down their content by password are, in effect, granting an implied license. However,
courts have not been historically receptive to this argument—and for good reason, as use of
password protection or other web protocols (for example, a web protocol excluding web
crawlers) cannot distinguish between uses and access that a copyright holder may wish to
permit (for example, indexing for purposes of search engine rankings) and those that it wishes
to disallow (for example, copying of images). See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S.
Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding no implied license where
copyright holder failed to employ a web protocol that excludes web crawlers, because there is
no “meeting of the minds between the copyright owner and the owner of the web crawler” as
to what uses the copyright holder is granting access to). Associated Press, 931 F. Supp. at 563.
In any event, because the images at issue here were made available by third parties, not Perfect
10, even this opt-in/opt-out system would not work. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser,
Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 801 (2007).
95. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
96. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
97. Id. at 208.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 209–10.
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In holding that Google’s digitization and display of copyrighted material
constituted fair use, the district court found that the “benefits of Google’s
book project are many.”101 The court noted: “Books will become more
accessible. Libraries, schools, researchers, and disadvantaged populations
will gain access to far more books.”102 “Digitization” would also “facilitate
the conversion of books to Braille and audio formats, increasing access for
individuals with disabilities.”103 Authors, too, would benefit, because “new
audiences will be generated and new sources of income created. Older
books—particularly out-of-print books, many of which are falling apart
buried in library stacks—will be preserved and given new life.”104 The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of fair use, finding both
the search and snippet view functions “highly transformative.”105
This part has detailed how a combination of legislation and common law
fostered the growth and viability of services like YouTube, Vimeo, Google
Images, and Google Books. These technology platforms offer users the
ability to express themselves, to upload that self-expression, to watch others
as they engaged in acts of identity and meaning-making, and to access the
world’s culture as if pulling books—or images, or music—off an infinite
shelf. Law worked in tandem with technology to change the conditions of
cultural production, in a way that copyright scholars argued was valuable—
because digital technologies made “the values of a democratic culture salient
to us,” in that it “offers the technological possibility of widespread cultural
participation,” giving “ordinary people a say in the progress and development
of the cultural forces that in turn produce them.”106 But perhaps it is now
difficult to even speak of Google or YouTube in such positive terms. If
legislation and common law had unwittingly helped Google along—by
allowing it to take others’ content without permission or payment under the
auspices of fair use or by creating a statutory ceiling through the safe harbor
that gives it unfair bargaining leverage as against copyright holders—might
it be time we reformed our copyright laws to rein Google, Facebook, and
Amazon back in? As Part II discusses, a number of changes or contemplated
changes to copyright laws aim to do just that.

101. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d,
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 229. For an argument that a class action settlement would
be in fact a better remedy than fair use, as it would provide copyright holders who opt into
digitization with compensation and an opt-out mechanism for copyright holders who do not
wish for their books to be digitized, see Xiyin Tang, Copyright Class Actions and Blanket
Licensing by Litigation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
106. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35, 37 (2004) (emphasis added).
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II. COPYRIGHT’S TECHNO-PESSIMIST CREEP
If certain copyright statutes, doctrines, and blanket licenses promoted the
development of internet platforms, recent changes in the laws are working to
scale back the excesses of the internet companies that benefitted the most
from these regimes. Like the conversations currently happening around
§ 230,107 the most prominent copyright law to undergo scrutiny and reform
in the past year is the § 512 safe harbor. This part first discusses how changes
in European copyright laws that removed safe harbor protection for most
technology platforms could serve as precedent for ongoing conversations
surrounding safe harbor reform in U.S. copyright law, before discussing how
techno-pessimist sentiment is shaping the rhetoric being wielded by
rightsholders to their advantage.
A. Safe Harbor Reform and Closing the Technology “Value Gap”
On April 17, 2019, the European Parliament adopted a sweeping reform to
EU copyright laws.108 Titled the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single
Market Directive (DSM), the DSM drastically changed how technology
companies like Google or Facebook do business. Specifically included in
the DSM was Article 17,109 which effectively gutted safe harbor protection
for certain online platforms, requiring that services which make available a
large amount of user-generated content—services like Google and
Facebook—affirmatively go out and get licenses for all copyrighted content
its users share on the platform before any such content may be posted.110 The
DSM is, essentially, the opposite of § 512, as it holds platforms responsible
for the infringements of their users and the myriad content containing
potentially copyrighted material posted by them.111
The motivation behind this inversion of traditional copyright liability rules
was precisely the perceived market power of online platforms. According to
European policy makers, copyright holders lacked bargaining leverage when
negotiating with them. The DSM thus “gives publishers and authors the
means to negotiate better with digital platforms,” putting rightsholders “in a
stronger and fairer position to negotiate and be paid when a platform puts
their work online.”112 In many ways, this argument echoes the sentiment
voiced by many outside the copyright space—for example, by retailers who
107. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
108. See Council Directive 2019/790, 2019 O.J. (L 130) (EU) [hereinafter DSM].
109. Note that this Article omits discussions of Article 15, which requires technology
platforms to pay news organizations for displaying snippets of their copyrighted articles,
because it deserves its own robust scholarly analysis. My preliminary analysis, however, is
that a service provider’s conscious decision to display “snippets” of news articles (as opposed
to just the link), which is almost always likely to be copyrighted by a third party, likely falls
outside of the ambit of safe harbor protection and thus would require a license.
110. DSM, supra note 108, art. 17.
111. Id.
112. European Commission Press Release, SPEECH/18/3124, Speech by Vice-President
Ansip on Copyright at the Charles Clark Memorial Lecture, London Book Fair (Apr. 10, 2018)
[hereinafter Press Release].
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have long complained that, because they are reliant on a platform like
Amazon for their business, they lack any leverage against the technology
giant.113
To further cement the idea that safe harbor laws unfairly create one-sided
licensing negotiations in favor of digital platforms, rightsholders coined a
term that quickly rose in favor among lawmakers and the general public: the
“value gap.”114 While originally a term of art unique to the music industry,
the term “value gap” came to symbolize everything and anything wrong with
the perceived dominance of technology platforms against the powerlessness
of rightsholders.
Originally a record industry term, the “value gap,” strictly speaking, refers
to the difference in rates by a service like YouTube,115 which can rely on the
safe harbor,116 and a service like Spotify that cannot (because Spotify itself,
rather than the users, posts the content).117 The term, then, merely speaks to
a fundamental truth about statutory rates—rates are always going to be lower
when negotiated under the shadow of a statute, hence why the term “statutory
ceiling” exists. For example, in the music publishing—as opposed to record
label—context,118 rightsholders have long complained of what they
perceived as an unfair gap between music publishing revenues, which are
regulated by both the § 115 mechanical license and the ASCAP/BMI consent
decrees,119 and record label revenues, which are unregulated (except for, of
113. See Charles Duhigg, Is Amazon Unstoppable?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/10/21/is-amazon-unstoppable
[https://perma.cc/F4YR-7GYN]. One producer who has refused to sell his products on
Amazon describes the platform as “own[ing] the marketplace.” Id. That producer continued,
“[t]hey can do whatever they want”—in a move that isn’t even “capitalism” but, as he
describes it, in the ultimate language of the IP maximalists, “piracy.” Id.
114. See Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”: How the Music
Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323 (2020).
115. In 2019, Google merged its interactive streaming service, Google Play, into YouTube,
under the confusing names YouTube Music and YouTube Premium. See Julian Chokkattu and
Abigail Bassett, YouTube Music Is Replacing Google Play Music: Here’s Where, When and
Why, DIGITALTRENDS (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.digitaltrends.com/music/what-happens-togoogle-play-music-youtube-music/ [https://perma.cc/JS6S-H7FP].
Any discussion of
“YouTube” in this Article excludes the interactive streaming component. But I note here that,
while the exact license agreements are confidential, it has been publicly reported that
YouTube’s interactive streaming component pays in fact much higher per-stream rates than
other interactive streaming services like Spotify.
116. Notably, however, YouTube has instead chosen to enter into content licenses with
rightsholders. See Sag, supra note 39, at 541–42 (terming the agreements that YouTube has
entered into with rightsholders in the shadow of the DMCA as “DMCA-plus” agreements).
117. See INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2015, at
23 (2015) (“The key to addressing the ‘value gap’ is to create a fair licensing environment.
Currently, this does not exist. This is because certain content platforms (that is services such
as YouTube and Dailymotion) claim that they are merely neutral hosting services entitled to
benefit from exemptions to copyright law (akin to internet service providers), rather than
digital distribution services akin to Deezer or Spotify, which do not benefit from such
exemptions.”).
118. There are two copyrights underlying every song: a musical composition copyright,
which is usually owned by music publishers, and a sound recording copyright, which is usually
owned by record labels. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7).
119. See supra Part I.B.
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course, by any applicable safe harbors).120 In fact, in this context,
rightsholders have lauded agreements negotiated with YouTube as “model
agreements,”121 while simultaneously deriding services like Spotify, which
can take advantage of the statutory § 115 rate and thus, pay less.122
But of course, as the example above shows, a gap between statutory rates
and rates negotiated outside of any applicable statutes have nothing to do
with the market power of technology platforms. Spotify possesses
considerably less market power than tech titan Google. But because, in the
music publishing context, Spotify can take advantage of the § 115 license
and YouTube’s audiovisual content cannot,123 rates negotiated with
YouTube outside of the statutory shadow are higher. If the safe harbor
creates lower rates, it does so for any platform eligible for the safe harbor—
everything from lesser-known websites like Dailymotion to tech giants like
Google.124
Soon enough, however, as the term “value gap” began to gather
momentum with lawmakers and the public, earlier attacks on any platform
that could avail itself of statutory rates—including websites like
Dailymotion—fell away. Instead, the term “value gap” took on a new
meaning: rather than refer to the difference between technology platforms
that paid statutory rates and technology platforms that had to negotiate
market rates, the term instead pitted the immense wealth of technology
platforms against the content holders who had long suffered unfair returns.125
The United States is now actively reconsidering its own safe harbor laws.
While the Copyright Office’s recently concluded study of § 512 did not
recommend any major changes to the statute, there is now a fervent and
renewed legislative interest in reforming the statute.126 In addition to holding
a series of hearings on § 512,127 members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property have asked a series of follow-up
questions to the Copyright Office about how § 512 can be reformed,

120. See Written Direct Statement of Copyright Owners at 21, Determination of Rates and
Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 1 (Oct. 28,
2016) (No. 16-CRB-0003-PR) (“[T]he statutory [§ 115 mechanical license] rate often acts as
a ceiling on what can be achieved in direct negotiations undertaken in the shadow of the
compulsory license.”).
121. Id. at 5.
122. Id. at 27.
123. See Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing
Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 1918, 1941 (Copyright Royalty Bd. Feb. 5,
2019) (final rule and order) (content owners’ expert selected a YouTube contract as a
benchmark “because neither the musical works license nor the sound recording license is
subject to the § 115 license”).
124. See id.
125. See European Commission Press Release MEMO/19/1151, Questions & Answers:
EU Negotiators Reach a Breakthrough to Modernise Copyright Rules (Feb. 13, 2019)
(describing how Article 17 will close the “value gap” and enable creators to finally be
remunerated fairly for their works).
126. See text accompanying supra note 13.
127. See supra notes 43, 45 and accompanying text.
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including a specific inquiry into the workability of a “notice and staydown”
regime128—the very same phrase that has been used to describe the DSM.129
As former European Parliament member and Harvard’s Berkman Klein
Center researcher Julia Reda notes, there is good reason to believe that
similar changes could be coming to U.S. copyright law. “There is a
tried-and-tested tradition of Hollywood companies lobbying for stricter
copyright in Europe, just to turn around to US policy-makers to demand the
same extensions be enacted in domestic law,” Reda writes.130 This was
precisely what happened with one of the most controversial U.S. Copyright
Act amendments, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,131 which
extended copyright terms by an additional twenty years.132
With interest coalescing around reforms to § 230, which, like § 512, treats
service providers as neutral conduits, the continued viability of the safe
harbor in its current form is very much in question. Indeed, just months after
the Copyright Office concluded its § 512 study, Senator Thom Tillis released
his own discussion draft for reforming the safe harbor in late December
2020.133 Among the revisions Senator Tillis included in the draft was
replacing
the
current
notice-and-takedown
system
with
a
notice-and-staydown system.134 Professor Rebecca Tushnet, at a hearing on
§ 512 reform, was quick to point out the natural corollary between the
growing chorus of voices on both the left and the right that are calling for the
reform of § 230 and the increased scrutiny on § 512: “The two issues are
very much connected . . . . They’re both under pressure, and opponents of

128. Letter from Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy, to Maria Strong, Acting Reg. of
Copyrights and Dir. (May 29, 2020).
129. See Bridy, supra note 114, at 353–54.
130. Julia Reda, Why Americans Should Worry About the New EU Copyright Rules,
BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/whyamericans-should-worry-about-the-new-eu-copyright-rules-97800be3f8fc
[https://perma.cc/7Q5Q-ECFZ].
131. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C.).
132. Id. The Senate report for the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act provides
that it was meant to “harmoniz[e] U.S. copyright law to that of the European Union.” S. REP.
NO. 104-315, at 3 (1996). Almost as soon as the Act was passed, it was challenged in court
(Larry Lessig represented the plaintiffs), a challenge that the Supreme Court ultimately
rejected. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). For a discussion of how this term
extension harms U.S. copyright law, see James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and
the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 40 (2003)
(discussing how “lengthening the copyright term . . . can be understood as a vote of
no-confidence in the productive powers of the commons”).
133. See Press Release, Sen. Thom Tillis, Tillis Releases Landmark Discussion Draft to
Reform the Digital Millennium (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/12/tillisreleases-landmark-discussion-draft-to-reform-the-digital-millennium-copyright-act
[https://perma.cc/7PUS-UENQ].
134. 12/18 Discussion Draft For Stakeholder Comments Only, THOM TILLIS
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/97A73ED6-EBDF-4206-ADEB6A745015C14B [https://perma.cc/C6EQ-CTAK].
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both tend to lump a bunch of bad things together.”135 Practitioners, likewise,
agreed that “[t]he DMCA discussion and the [Section] 230 discussion are
related; there’s no question about that.”136 And just as public sentiment
swung from believing that § 230 provided much-needed immunity to the
internet to a newfound conviction that it was the very law that helped Big
Tech grow to unparalleled dominance, so too the public sentiment has shifted
toward a deep antipathy toward safe harbor reform. As one lawyer who
represented technology platforms in the original § 512 negotiations decades
ago acknowledged bluntly, “the political terrain has changed.”137 Why else,
then, would the Walt Disney Company and the Motion Picture Association
focus on lobbying lawmakers to overhaul § 230, which has little to do with
copyright? Again, as Professor Tushnet pointed out, “it’s about messaging:
By drumming up opposition against one of big tech’s key legal shields, rival
industries hope that momentum will bleed into a new fight targeting the tech
industry’s protections against copyright liability.”138
Just like the Copyright Office study, which others, like Professor Pamela
Samuelson, have critiqued as being almost single-handedly in favor of
content owners,139 Senator Tillis’s proposed draft legislation makes no
pretense of attempting to balance the rights of service providers against
content owners. Instead, Senator Tillis has been clear that reforms to § 512
are necessary “to better encourage the creation of copyrightable works”—in
other words, to better serve the needs of content owners.140
But when we remove safe harbors, we in fact skew licensing negotiations
solely in favor of content holders, who have the power of copyright
infringement suits—including injunctive relief and crippling statutory
damages—as the ultimate leverage. Some, like Professor Mark Lemley,
have called the arsenal of remedies that infringement suits afford copyright
holders supracompensatory, because statutory damages can far exceed actual
damages and a copyright user can be forced to completely cease all infringing
activity, meaning that ultimately, infringement suits threaten users with
remedies far above paying a market-rate license.141 In part because of the
uncertainty created by injunctive relief and supracompensatory damages,
companies like YouTube may nonetheless choose to enter into agreements
with content holders, even if they could technically choose to rely on the
zero-price safe harbor instead. The threat of years-long, million-dollar
copyright litigation—to say nothing of the possibility of billions of dollars in
damages exposure—already severely curtails any bargaining leverage

135. Press Release, Sen. Thom Tillis, Copyright Liability Emerges as Latest Threat to Big
Tech’s Legal Shield (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/2/copyright-liabilityemerges-as-latest-threat-to-big-tech-s-legal-shield [https://perma.cc/JW9C-AANJ].
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Pushing Back on Stricter Copyright ISP Liability
Rules, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 299 (2021).
140. See Press Release, supra note 133.
141. See Lemley, supra note 94, at 196–97.
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created by the safe harbor.142 Removing safe harbors entirely creates
one-sided licensing negotiations—in favor of content owners.143
Finally, as Part I noted, there is little truth to the suggestion that the content
industry is an industry hobbled by the growth of digital and reduced to
receiving paltry sums for copyrighted works. Content industry revenues are
in fact up.144
B. Reshaping the Law and Rhetoric of Copyright in Techno-Pessimism’s
Image
Just as “value gap” took on new power when retooled as a term about the
inequalities engendered by Big Tech, so too did rightsholders begin to see
the rhetorical power in reshaping other parts of copyright law as
fundamentally about combatting platform dominance.
One such example manifested itself in public arguments and written
submissions made by the National Music Publishers’ Association (NMPA)
(the main trade association for music publishers and songwriters) before the
DOJ.145 Unsurprisingly, following the court rulings prohibiting partial
withdrawal under the consent decrees discussed in Part I, the NMPA began
advocating to modify the consent decrees altogether—to allow precisely for
partial withdrawal for digital platforms.146 The NMPA’s renewed focus on
advocating for carving new media companies out of the consent decrees came
at a time when Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim had already
voiced hints at coming reforms to the decrees—in late 2019, the DOJ opened
a new investigation into the continued need for the consent decrees and called
for public comments.147
In response, the NMPA filed a response that, in its first introductory pages,
seized upon the powerful narrative of unequal wealth that had dominated the
debates surrounding Article 17. New media companies, the NMPA argued,
142. See Sag, supra note 39, at 541 (“[A]lthough the safe harbors are working well for
some platforms, others find that they are not as safe as they had hoped. To mitigate this
uncertainty, a number of platforms that host large quantities of music and audio-visual works
have agreed to go beyond the requirements of the DMCA and proactively filter user content
in an effort to reduce infringement and to appease rightsholders. Most obviously, YouTube’s
development of Content ID appears to have been spurred by the Viacom litigation that began
almost as soon as Google acquired the video-sharing company in 2006.”).
143. The DSM’s exemption of services with revenues of under ten million dollars per year
does not ameliorate the problem, as copyright infringement exposure for relatively new
upstarts, as YouTube had been when it was sued by Viacom, easily exceeds this threshold.
See infra Part IV.A.
144. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. While illegal digital platforms like
Napster had decimated industry revenues back in the early aughts, these are not the types of
platforms protected under the safe harbors that the DSM takes aim at. See A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
145. NAT’L MUSIC PUBLISHERS’ ASS’N, “SELECTIVE WITHDRAWAL” OF NEW MEDIA RIGHTS
FROM ASCAP AND BMI (2019) [hereinafter NMPA Submission].
146. Id.
147. Antitrust Consent Decree Review—ASCAP and BMI 2019, DEP’T OF JUST.
(Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-consent-decree-review-ascap-and-bmi2019 [https://perma.cc/9VM5-TY94].
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“are much larger and more powerful than the music licensees who were the
intended beneficiaries of the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees.”148
Harnessing the language of techno-pessimism and its rhetoric of platform
dominance and monopoly power, the NMPA writes: “The music distribution
market today is dominated by companies that are exponentially larger than
the music publishing industry as a whole, including Google, Amazon, and
Apple, each of which has the resources and the size to negotiate licenses
directly with copyright owners and often does so.”149 (Never mind, of
course, that one of the biggest beneficiaries of the consent decrees is Spotify,
a company whose name is not (yet) synonymous with techno-pessimist
antitrust regulation and, therefore, presumably, not cited in this discussion of
market dominance.)150
The NMPA went on to cite the yearly revenue that Google, Amazon, and
Apple bring in, noting that they make “hundreds of billions in yearly revenue
and have a combined market capitalization that exceeds $2 trillion.”151
Never mind, of course, that this is across every single product line, from
Google Maps to Amazon Web Services (which alone brings in over
thirty-five billion dollars in revenue per year)152—product lines that have
nothing to do with the streaming of music and thus are entirely severable
from whether these companies want to continue with the business of music
streaming as a viable business model, at all.
While the DOJ ultimately concluded that the consent decrees should not
be modified, including to permit “partial withdrawal,” for the current
moment,153 there is reason to believe that copyright law is headed
increasingly toward carveouts for new technologies. Indeed, the recently
passed MMA may well serve as precedent for partial withdrawal, as it
requires only digital services like Spotify and Google to pay a different—
almost in all likelihood higher—royalty rate for the public performance of
sound recordings.154 The resulting royalties under the MMA will be
determined according to a “willing buyer/willing seller” standard, which
scholars agree will almost certainly result in higher rates than the previous
801(b) policy-based standard, which permitted an adjustment downward of

148. NMPA Submission, supra note 145, at 3.
149. Id. at 4–5.
150. Spotify is a prominent member of the Digital Media Association, the trade group that
submitted comments to the DOJ warning against partial withdrawal. See ASCAP/BMI
CONSENT DECREE REVIEW, JOINT PUBLIC COMMENTS OF RADIO MUSIC LICENSE COMMITTEE
AND DIGITAL MEDIA ASSOCIATION (2019), https://media.justice.gov/vod/atr/ascapbmi2019/
pc-619.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD5E-6LRY].
151. NMPA Submission, supra note 145, at 16–17 (emphasis omitted).
152. See Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Form (Form 10-K), at 67 (Dec. 5, 2019).
153. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Statement of the Department of Justice on
the Closing of the Antitrust Division’s Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Jan.
15, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1355391/download [https://perma.cc/4GCZLF49].
154. Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 17, 19, and 28 U.S.C.); see Kristelia A. Garcia & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of
Copyright’s Term, 71 ALA. L. REV. 351, 404–405 (2019).
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rates for a digital platform’s technological contributions.155 As compared to
the previous 801(b) policy-based rate, a willing buyer/willing seller standard
is closer to a market-based standard and makes no such accommodations for
the benefits of new modes of distribution.156 If anything, the rhetoric of the
overwhelming power and wealth that technology companies hold will
continue to be wielded, at times to availing effect, by rightsholders seeking
increased payouts from an unsympathetic licensee.
Finally, the dissent in the recently issued Supreme Court decision Google
LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.157 gives a window into how techno-pessimism
can reshape fair use doctrine, which has historically been the only
common-law doctrine in copyright flexible enough to allow technologically
transformative uses of copyrighted works. In this closely watched case,
Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement of Oracle’s API packages—
prewritten source code programs that allow programmers to build certain
functions into their own programs (rather than writing new code from
scratch).158 In reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision that Google’s use was
not fair, the majority in Oracle America, Inc. focused on the functionality of
Oracle’s code, holding that the “code is, if copyrightable at all, further than
are most computer programs . . . from the core of copyright” and thus entitled
to only a thin scope of copyright protection.159
Thus, while the decision ultimately turned on the unique nature of the
copyrighted work at issue—largely functional computer code—the dissent
previews how a fair use case pitting a copyrighted work closer to the “core”
of protection (books, films, music) against a major technology company
could come out very differently. While the majority focuses in great detail
on factor two of the fair use analysis, which looks to the nature of the
copyrighted work (in this case, highly functional),160 the dissent focused in
on factor four—the market harm suffered by Oracle.161 “By copying
Oracle’s work, Google decimated Oracle’s market and created a mobile
operating system now in over 2.5 billion actively used devices, earning tens
of billions of dollars every year,” wrote Justice Thomas.162 “If these effects
on Oracle’s potential market favor Google, something is very wrong with our
fair-use analysis,” he concluded.163
Notably, while the Federal Circuit’s decision below had likewise focused
on the market harm factor in its holding that Google did not make fair use of
155. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b); see Jacob Victor, Reconceptualizing Compulsory Copyright
Licenses, 72 STAN. L. REV. 915, 961, 989 (2020).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b); see Victor, supra note 155, at 976.
157. 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
158. Id. at 1190.
159. Id. at 1202.
160. Id. at 1202–04.
161. See id. at 1215 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The fourth factor—the effect of Google’s
copying on the potential market for Oracle’s work—is ‘undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 566 (1985))).
162. Id. at 1218.
163. Id.

1176

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Oracle’s copyrighted work, the Federal Circuit was somewhat oblique in its
reasoning on this factor, leading several IP scholars to comment that “the
Federal Circuit ignored controlling Ninth Circuit law and found that Oracle
suffered market harm in a market it was unlikely to enter and despite the fact
that Google copied only a tiny fraction of Oracle’s code.”164 Likewise, in
reversing the Federal Circuit and holding that Oracle was unlikely to suffer
market harm, the Court noted that the jury had found that the copyright holder
itself was unlikely, and indeed poorly positioned, to enter the mobile phone
market.165
By contrast, the dissenting members of the Court were far blunter in their
reasoning as to why Google should be found to have caused Oracle to suffer
market harm. “Google . . . recently was fined a record $5 billion for abusing
Android to violate antitrust laws,” wrote Justice Thomas, citing a European
Commission finding.166 “If the majority is worried about monopolization, it
ought to consider whether Google is the greater threat.”167 In other words, if
we want to combat the growing threat of tech monopolies, we cannot allow
already enormously wealthy parties like Google to benefit further from the
zero-fee defense of fair use. This simple and intuitive reductionism
condenses the multi-factor fair use analysis to a single question: can the
defendant afford to pay? But, in doing so, it poses enormous harm to all fair
use cases, most of which do not involve an unsympathetic and wealthy
defendant, because in every fair use case, the defendant could, theoretically,
have gotten a license instead. The very reason fair use exists is precisely
because a use that is fair does not require a license.168 If rightsholders can
reshape fair use reasoning in techno-pessimism’s image, the doctrine risks
falling into the dangerous circularity that copyright scholars have long
warned of.169
Oracle America, Inc. was unique because it concerned a type of
copyrighted work (software) long accorded a narrower scope of
protection.170 But in a typical fair use case, unlike in Oracle America, Inc.,

164. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7, at 120.
165. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1206.
166. Id. at 1217–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1218.
168. See Lemley, supra note 94, at 191 (noting that the lost licensing theory of fair use, in
which any use in which defendant can afford to pay is one that cannot be fair, threatens to
“contract the doctrine of fair use to a few protected categories, with the baseline assumption
being that any use requires permission and a licensing fee”).
169. See, e.g., id.; 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05 (Matthew Bender ed., 2020).
170. See, e.g., Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that the highly functional nature of computer user interfaces means that
they “may lie very near the line of uncopyrightability”); Paul Goldstein, Infringement of
Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1119, 1125 (1986) (describing computer
software as accorded a “very thin” level of protection); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2351
(1994) (arguing that computer program behavior should not be accorded any copyright
protection).

2021]

COPYRIGHT'S TECHNO-PESSIMIST CREEP

1177

factor two is rarely dispositive.171 Instead, factor four—the market harm
factor—is often considered the most important fair use factor.172 And if the
dissent’s honing in on the defendant’s dominance in the market harm analysis
is a harbinger of things to come, it suggests a powerful opening for copyright
holders—who often wield vast monopoly power—to turn the lens away from
their own dominance and toward the dominance of the defendant technology
platform. They can point to ongoing antitrust investigations or concluded
ones, as the dissent aptly did in Oracle America, Inc., conveniently erasing
the fact that copyright holders possess enormous market power. That power
is often wielded to stop legitimate competition that threatens their very
dominance—while reshaping the long history of content holders’ antagonism
to disruption and innovation, reframing it as, somehow, a heroic,
public-minded stand against Big Tech.173 Part III examines the long history
of content holder market power and whether it has significantly weakened in
the past decade with the rise of large technology platforms.
III. MARKET POWER, ANTITRUST, AND COPYRIGHT LAW
These days, “antitrust violation” and “Big Tech” are seen together so often
in buzzy headlines that the two terms have become almost interchangeable,
one simply synonymous and proof-positive of the other. But copyright law
is unique and different from other types of market transactions, because those
negotiating against powerful technology platforms are often not diffuse
parties with little bargaining power.174 Many are, instead, concentrated
oligopolies that enjoy market dominance of their own. This part first
summarizes the history of certain large content holders’ market power in
copyright transactions, before examining whether the rise of digital has
significantly changed this traditional landscape.

171. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 586 (2008) (explaining that in an empirical analysis of three-plus
decades of fair use opinions, factor two was “shown to exert no significant effect” on the
outcome of the fair use analysis).
172. See id. (describing empirical data showing that “the first and fourth factors are shown
each to exert an enormous amount of influence on the outcome of the test, with the fourth very
much in the driver’s seat”).
173. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7, at 119–20.
174. Of course, this statement cannot apply to each and every copyright industry.
Certainly, many of them—photography, journalism, fine art—are, indeed, small and diffuse
parties with weak bargaining power. That journalism, in particular, may face a threat from
the dominance of technology platforms is significant. As I noted, this Article does not take
up Article 15 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, which requires digital
platforms to compensate news outlets for providing “snippets” of their articles. For a rich and
thoughtful discussion of this topic, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Mandating Digital Platform
Support for Quality Journalism, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 473 (2021). This Article merely
focuses on large copyright industries that, unsurprisingly, drive much of the copyright policy
in the United States—notably, the music and film industries.

1178

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

A. A History of Content Holder Oligopolies
A significant portion of the copyright industry is controlled by a
staggeringly small number of players. Much of rights ownership, far from a
diffuse web of interests spread out amongst individual creators, artists, and
authors, is instead concentrated in a handful of large corporations that,
together, drive copyright policy in the United States.175 While just a few
copyright sectors—the motion picture, recorded music, publishing, and
software industries176—dominate copyright policy internally, each of these
sectors also “face the oligopolist dominance of a handful of firms.”177
Of course, by its very nature, intellectual property rights create limited
monopolies. Copyright holders, whether Universal Music Group or a
hobbyist photographer, enjoy market power because they are able to charge
higher than a competitive price for a given good or service.178 Thus, where
copyright holders enjoy monopoly pricing and do not own a copyright in their
work, the relevant question is not whether the market is competitive (since it
cannot be) but instead how workably competitive the market is.179
“Workable competition” does not require marginal cost pricing—which is
impossible because copyright rewards producers for the cost of creating the
first, not subsequent, copy180—but requires that copyright holders merely
compete with each other on pricing. If downstream licensees have the ability
to choose between several works that, while not perfect substitutes, are
approximate substitutes, then licensors could compete with each other over
pricing to attract buyers or licensees. But if licensors do not have the ability
to substitute because each copyrighted work is a “must have” work for
purposes of the licensee’s end product, then copyright holders enjoy market
power and will charge supracompetitive prices for their works.181
175. See generally LITMAN, supra note 40 (describing the various industries that got a seat
at the bargaining table of major copyright legislation—notably, the recorded music, motion
picture, and publishing industries).
176. See id. at 126 (the motion picture industry, the recorded music industry, book
publishers, and software companies together represented all copyright content owners in
legislative reform of the Copyright Act for the new digital age).
177. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 132 (2008).
178. See id. at 128–29.
179. See generally J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON.
REV. 241 (1940).
180. See NETANEL, supra note 177, at 124 (“When the good is a book, the marginal cost
would equal the cost of printing and distributing one more copy. In the case of text on a Web
site, the marginal cost would be virtually nothing—only the negligible cost of transmitting the
text over the Internet to one more user. In neither event would marginal cost reflect the
author’s ‘first-copy’ costs, the investment in creating the text that is to be distributed.”).
181. Indeed, the copyright mechanical license, § 115, specifically regulates music
publishers like public utilities. 17 U.S.C. § 115. In advocating that creative industries should
not be subject to regulation like “railroad systems” or “streetcar lines,” the NMPA had argued
that “[m]onopoly and public utility aspects are just not prevalent in [the music publishing and
songwriting] industry.” Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 383 (1967) (statement of Robert R.
Nathan, Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.). Yet, it was the opposing position of the
licensees—that in fact music publishers do act like public utilities—that ultimately formed the
basis for the mechanical license. See Victor, supra note 155, at 978.
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Copyright scholars studying this issue a decade ago had concluded that the
market for copyrighted works lacked approximate substitutes because
consumer demand clustered around a small number of works182—think Top
40s hits, Hollywood blockbusters, books on the top of The New York Times
Best Sellers lists. And indeed, because consumers “wish to convey, refer to,
critique, learn from, or reformulate” a select number of “culturally seminal”
works—and where using commonly understood signifiers as reference
points, those shared points of knowledge bear more cultural force than
referring to or reformulating obscure or unknown works—the market for
expressive goods, these scholars posited, may in fact be less competitive than
markets for many other products.183
That the market for copyrighted works is not workably competitive is
further exacerbated by a second, related problem: concentration among
sellers or copyright holders. Writing in 2008, Professor Neil Weinstock
Netanel warned that:
[The] copyright industries that dominate public discourse have reached
levels of concentration that are deleterious to both competition and
expressive diversity. As of this writing, four major labels control some 85
percent of the U.S. record industry market . . . six major studios
consistently garner well over 80 percent of domestic box office market
share, and ten publishing houses enjoy oligopoly domination of the trade
and paperback book markets.184

These two issues—(1) consumer demand clustering around a small
number of works and (2) concentration among copyright holders—are not a
story unique to the twenty-first century. While the specific names may have
changed, the story has remained much the same throughout the past century.
Criminal antitrust prosecutions against NBC and CBS, along with musical
works organizations ASCAP and BMI, created the consent decrees in the
1940s.185 The original complaints filed against ASCAP and BMI centered
around the fact that both musical works owners controlled the repertoires to
an immense number of copyrighted works, requiring each licensee to either
“accept a license from the [collective] upon any terms and conditions
imposed by the Society or subject themselves to numerous infringement
suits.”186
B. The Digital Age: Some Things Change, but Much Stays the Same
The pertinent question, then, is whether the rise of Big Tech and the
subsequent shift to digital modes of consumption have fundamentally shifted
this long history of content holder market power in these dominant industries.
It may be tempting, after all, to conclude that technology has fundamentally
182. See NETANEL, supra note 177, at 131.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 144.
185. Turner Catledge, ASCAP, Radio Chains To Be Prosecuted as Music ‘Trusts’, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1940, at 1, 12.
186. Id.
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changed things. But not only does recent evidence from marketplace
negotiations dispute this intuition,187 other developments—the further
consolidation of firms within the dominant copyright sectors, a shift in
consumer demand toward greater interactivity and larger catalogs, and the
decreased costs of distribution leading to vertical integration within content
firms—all suggest that there has been no significant weakening of content
holder market power.
1. The Marketplace for Copyrighted Goods Is Becoming More
Concentrated
Since 2008, the music industry has further consolidated, resulting in only
three major labels and publishers, with the merger of Universal and EMI on
the record label side and Sony and EMI on the music publishing side.
Notably, Universal, in connection with its proposed merger with EMI,
specifically asserted to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that “the
proposed merger would not lessen competition because the market for
interactive [streaming] services was already not competitive.”188 In 2016,
record label executives confirmed in testimony before the Copyright Royalty
Board (an administrative panel tasked with setting rates for certain types of
streaming services) that there was an effective lack of price competition in
the market for their copyrighted works, stating that they had “never lowered
a proposed [license] rate as a consequence of finding out that another Major
[label] was offering a lower rate.”189
In the motion picture industry, the six major Hollywood studios are now
five, as the Walt Disney Company purchased Twentieth Century Fox, its
smaller but still threatening rival, in a move that is not unlike the Big Tech
acquisitions that antitrust regulators had vowed to undo around the exact
same time that the FTC approved the merger.190
Across these dominant copyright industries, that an effective lack of price
competition exists among copyright holders is both confirmed and
exacerbated by the use of most-favored nation (MFN) clauses in content
license agreements.191 MFNs generally provide that if another, comparably

187. See supra Part II.B.
188. Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and Webcasting
Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV), 81 Fed. Reg. 26,316, 26,342 (Copyright
Royalty Bd. May 2, 2016) (final rule and order) [hereinafter Web IV]. Unfortunately, most of
the documents submitted by Universal to the FTC in connection with its proposed, and later
approved, merger are confidential. The Web IV opinion redacts large portions of these
statements.
189. Id.
190. See Matthew S. Schwartz, Disney Officially Owns 21st Century Fox, NPR (Mar. 20,
2019, 6:17 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/20/705009029/disney-officially-owns-21stcentury-fox [https://perma.cc/ASQ7-8TMT].
191. See Micah Singleton, This Was Sony Music’s Contract with Spotify, VERGE
(May 19, 2015, 10:15 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/5/19/8621581/sony-musicspotify-contract [https://perma.cc/L7BZ-TUK8] (“Having an MFN clause in a contract is
standard for music licensing contracts, according to multiple sources. MFNs have garnered
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sized licensor receives more favorable terms, those terms must be matched
across the board to all other comparably-sized licensors.192 MFNs facilitate
horizontal collusion by fixing prices for copyrighted works at the
highest-negotiated price.193 At least one large copyright industry—the book
publishing industry—has been investigated for potential antitrust violations
by the DOJ for the use of MFNs.194
2. Shifting Consumer Demand Means Less Upstream Competition
In some copyright industries, marketplace concentration among sellers
(copyright holders) is further exacerbated in a digital age where the
proliferation of user-generated content and on-demand, interactive streaming
services require making available a large amount of content owned by a small
number of firms as their value propositions. In music, the Copyright Royalty
Board has recognized that the catalogs of major labels are “must haves,” not
substitutes, because licensees need the catalog of each copyright owner to
run a viable interactive service.195
Indeed, even rights owners themselves have acknowledged that the more
interactive a service is—the more control a consumer has, whether in the
form of selecting something on-demand or choosing a song to incorporate
into a video—the more likely it is that content becomes a “must have.”196
And this is because the very point of these technologies is to make the entire
universe of content—or as close to an approximation thereof—available to
users, either to use as building blocks (in the case of user-generated
platforms) for speech or to dramatically increase the availability of, and
access to, copyrighted works. To these aggregators of content, copyrighted
works are complements, not approximate substitutes. And the easier it
becomes for users to access works, the higher users’ expectations are that,
for example, a Google Image Search result will contain all the relevant
images they need and that a Spotify subscription will get them access to
almost all the music they want, and the more digital services must adapt to
that consumer demand by offering as many copyrighted works as possible.

scrutiny in the past, and as part of its merger with EMI in 2012, Universal Music Group had
to stop using the clauses in Europe for 10 years. But they remain legal in the US.”).
192. See, e.g., id. (reporting that Sony’s MFN clause in its license agreement with Spotify
“essentially makes every major aspect of the contract amendable if any other label has a better
deal or interpretation of that aspect than Sony Music”).
193. See Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences:
Competitive Effects of “Most-Favored-Customer” Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 525
(1996) (explaining how MFNs facilitate horizontal collusion); Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing
Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983
WIS. L. REV. 887, 901–02, 932–35 (explaining how MFNs enable coordination by penalizing
discounting).
194. See Complaint, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),
aff’d, United States v. Apple, Inc. 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1193
(2016).
195. See Web IV, supra note 188, at 26,373.
196. Id.
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Take Pandora as an example. Pandora previously only offered a
noninteractive radio service that made it somewhat (but not completely)
easier for the platform to “steer” users toward content that Pandora wanted
them to listen to—for example, Katy Perry instead of Taylor Swift, if they
did not have rights to Taylor Swift’s repertoire. Still, content owners have
admitted that “the repertoire of each of the three Majors is a ‘must have’ in
order for a noninteractive service [like Pandora] to be viable.”197 But just a
few years ago, Pandora decided to introduce an interactive product.198
Pandora justified its introduction of an interactive service on the basis that
users were demanding interactive, on-demand functionality—functionality
like the ability to pick any song they wanted on demand or the ability to
replay a song.199 Pandora’s consumer research indicated that listeners likely
left Pandora at the moment they experienced a feature limitation (what is
called a “pain point”).200 Pandora concluded that:
[T]he absence of these additional [interactive] features on Pandora’s
service was hurting our product and our ability to maximize our appeal to
our listener base. This lack of functionality was inhibiting growth in
listener hours, contributing to a decline in monthly users, and limiting our
ability to attract new customers who wanted this additional
functionality.201

3. Fragmentation in the Content Streaming Market Means Content Holders
Can, and Do, Walk Away
In other dominant copyright industries, while upstream competition
among licensors has decreased,202 downstream competition among licensees
has dramatically increased. Data shows that Netflix’s market share for
over-the-top video streaming, for example, has drastically dropped—from 91
percent in 2007 to only 19 percent in 2019.203 Whereas content owners a
decade ago balked at the notion of starting their own streaming services,
choosing instead to rely on the traditional model of an intermediary
distributor, advances in technology over the past decade have allowed for any

197. Id.
198. See Introductory Memorandum to the Written Statement of Pandora Media, Inc., In
re Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords
(Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 1918, 1927 (Copyright Royalty Bd. Feb. 5, 2019).
199. Id.
200. See Witness Statement of Christopher Phillips ¶ 13, In re Determination of Royalty
Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg.
at 1927.
201. Id. ¶ 14.
202. See supra Part III.B.
203. See Travis Clark, Netflix Is Still Growing Wildly, But Its Market Share Has Fallen to
an Estimated 19% as New Competitors Emerge, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2020, 8:27 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/netflix-market-share-of-global-streaming-subscribersdropping-ampere-2020-1 [https://perma.cc/DF8S-JZGR] (“Netflix’s global market share of
over-the-top streaming video subscriptions has dropped from 91% in 2007 to 19% [in
2019].”).
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content owner to be able to also be a distributor.204 These days, almost every
producer of content—from Disney to HBO to Showtime to ESPN to CBS—
has become a distributor through the creation of dedicated streaming
channels. And this trend is not limited to the audiovisual space. Music
streaming, too, has become increasingly more competitive, as the
proliferation of new entrants result in an ever-more fragmented market.205
Robust downstream competition means licensors have greater walk-away
power than ever before, as an increasingly fragmented market means no one
single distributor dominates the market as one once may have back when
streaming delivery mechanisms were in their infancy. Even YouTube is no
longer the video streaming giant it once was, as internet users are gravitating
toward other platforms like Twitch, TikTok, and Instagram.206 Perhaps the
testimony of a music industry executive before the Copyright Royalty Board
put it best: “If a service were to say we’re just not going to play your records
because it costs too much, the reality is we can go—we have other
choices.”207
Content holders’ increasing moves to make their content exclusively
available on their own streaming platforms further evidences that technology
companies are far from essential platforms for the distribution of creative
content, both because of the proliferation of distributors (Spotify, YouTube
Premium, Pandora Plus, Tidal, Apple Music, Rhapsody—just to name a few
in the music streaming space) and because content holders can themselves
become distributors.208 Disney, for example, pulled content from its
previous distribution deals with Netflix and Hulu to make that content
exclusively available on its own streaming platform.209
204. See Lucas Shaw, Hollywood Studios Can’t Quit Netflix—Even If They Want To, L.A.
TIMES (May 30, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-netflix-hollywoodstudios-programs-20190530-story.html [https://perma.cc/X4XT-F3V9] (describing how film
companies such as Disney and NBCUniversal are increasingly creating their own streaming
services but are still bound by prior deals with Netflix to offer their content on Netflix’s
platform for years to come).
205. See Mark Mulligan, Music Subscriber Market Shares H1 2019, MIDIA (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://www.midiaresearch.com/blog/music-subscriber-market-shares-h1-2019
[https://perma.cc/DUD3-D9S9] (“In what is becoming an increasingly competitive market,
Spotify has continued to grow at the same rate as the overall market.”).
206. See Paige Leskin, I Spent 3 Days with Teens’ Favorite Social Media Stars and Now
I’m Convinced That You Don’t Need YouTube To Be Internet Famous, BUS. INSIDER
(July 17, 2019, 10:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/vidcon-proves-tiktok-twitchcreators-find-fame-without-youtube-2019-7 [https://perma.cc/3V88-PQNA].
207. Web IV, supra note 188, at 26,364.
208. As noted in Part II, this Article does not take up Article 15 of the DSM, otherwise
known as the “link tax,” which requires services to compensate news outlets for providing
“snippets” of their articles. DSM, supra note 108. Note that content holders, in advocating
for Article 17, did not argue that the rates they received from companies like YouTube were
too low because technology platforms acted as common-utility-type platforms, such that the
content holders must be on those platforms in order to meaningfully distribute their content.
Rather, their arguments were premised solely on the perceived gap created by the safe harbor,
which acts as a statutory ceiling. For a rebuttal to this argument, see supra Part II.A.
209. See Julia Alexander, Every Part of Disney Is Making Exclusive Content for the
Disney+ Streaming Service, VERGE (Feb. 5, 2019, 5:45 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/
2/5/18212646/disney-streaming-service-price-release-date [https://perma.cc/2G5J-B95U].

1184

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

In this story, “pain points” only run one way. A distributor needs as much
content on its platform as possible, because every service limitation, whether
in the form of limited interactivity, or limited catalog, creates a “pain point”
for the service—consider Spotify’s long, concerted campaign to woo Taylor
Swift back onto its service, as the CEO himself repeatedly went to Nashville
to cajole Swift’s team.210 But the fragmentation of streaming services means
content creators have choices—other services and, in many instances, their
own streaming platform. At least as far as cultural production and
dissemination by users is concerned, the internet is a work in progress;
today’s YouTube is tomorrow’s TikTok—at least, for now. But, as Part IV
of this Article argues, if new entrants are no longer entitled to safe harbors,
if they are forced to confront confusing and costly licensing laws, or if they
are faced with enormous start-up costs even before they know exactly what
their business model will look like, what kind of content their users wish to
share, or what kind of content will prove valuable to the service, the future
may look very different.
IV. THE MISGUIDED APPEAL OF REGULATING BIG TECH BY COPYRIGHT
As a handful of technology platforms have risen to unprecedented power,
recent scholarship has lamented the unwitting role that copyright minimalism
played in that ascent, citing some of the same laws—the safe harbor and fair
use—that this Article describes in Part I.211 Yet, if these laws “set the stage
for today’s extraordinary forms of platform power,” then that same
scholarship has stopped short of arguing that the solution is to pivot away
from them—for example, shrinking the scope of fair use so defendants like
Google can no longer rely on it.212 And absent from these accounts is the
inevitability that countering the previous decade’s overly optimistic
copyright minimalism by expanding rightsholders’ protections enriches and
empowers neither individuals nor consumers but large content holder
conglomerates who have benefitted the most from expansive intellectual
property laws. This part examines why recent efforts to scale back the same
laws that enabled the growth of technology platforms will only intensify
monopoly power, rather than lessen it. To combat the entrenchment of power
and dominance, and to be truly neo-Brandeisian in an era where today’s Big
Tech licensee is tomorrow’s copyright holder, one must think beyond
copyright law.
210. See Luke Morgan Britton, Spotify Boss Explains How He Convinced Taylor Swift to
Return to the Streaming Service, NME (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.nme.com/news/music/
spotify-boss-daniel-ek-talks-taylor-swift-streaming-return-2280169 [https://perma.cc/AD6KCYRK].
211. See Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 1493–94; supra Part I.
212. See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 9, at 1794, 1803 n.68, 1804 (noting that “Google
was a great driver and recipient of” the expansion in fair use doctrine which, in turn, “set the
stage for today’s extraordinary forms of platform power”). Of course, there is no such
suggestion that curtailing doctrines like fair use is the solution—far from it. See Kapczynski,
supra note 9, at 1496 (noting that perhaps there was no other alternative to the copyleft/free
culture movement of the 1990s and 2000s that may have unwittingly enabled corporate
powers, absent deeper changes to our market-based society).
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A. Regulating Big Tech by Copyright Will Create a Bilateral Oligopoly
If, as the argument goes, licensees like Google benefitted from lenient safe
harbor laws that allowed it to grow unchecked off the backs of free content,
then turning these laws in the other direction to raise licensing costs will not
have the opposite effect. Only dominant firms can use content as a loss
leader, subsidizing the high cost of licenses with other product and business
lines. And ultimately, those that cannot afford to do so—or even perhaps
those that can—will find ways to innovate around the cost, rendering the
traditional content license wholly obsolete.
1. Expensive Licenses Create Entrenched, Concentrated Licensee Markets
Requiring technology platforms to obtain expensive licenses for
user-generated content or requiring technology platforms to pay more for
licenses would further entrench, rather than enfeeble, dominant firms like
Apple and Google.213 These companies can, after all, use content as a loss
leader, subsidizing the high cost of content licenses with their other business
lines, so long as they decide there’s a business justification for doing so. For
example, copyright holders have argued previously that Amazon gives away
music for free in order to lure more subscribers to its Prime service.214
Likewise, copyright holders have also complained that Apple uses
copyrighted music to sell more iPhones.215 The net effect of using content
as a loss leader is that comparatively smaller entrants are kept out of the
market—even ones we think of as “large,” like Spotify, which did not turn a
profit for the first decade or so that it was in business.216
Recognizing that high content-licensing costs could keep smaller entrants
out of the market, Article 17 was revised prior to its adoption to include a
carveout for services that are less than three years old and that generate less
than ten million euros in revenue per year.217 Yet, the mere cost of putting
in place a system to detect the posting of unauthorized content, such as
Google’s Content ID, exceeds that threshold by a factor of ten218—to say
nothing of the cost of licensing content, which could cost a midsize company
like Spotify three billion dollars in annual royalties.219 A company that finds
213. See Letter to Antonio Tajani MEP, President of the European Parliament
(June 12, 2018), https://www.eff.org/files/2018/06/13/article13letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ES8Z-AL29]. Note that the letter references “Article 13,” which became Article 17 once it
passed into law. Id.; see also Michael Wolfe, Movements, Moments, and the Eroding Antitrust
Consensus, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1157, 1168–75 (2020).
214. See Web IV, supra note 188, at 1927.
215. See id. at 1921 (describing Amazon Music, Apple Music, and Google Play Music as
“part of wider economic ‘ecosystems,’ in which a music service is one part of a multi-product,
multi-service aggregation of activities”).
216. See id.
217. DSM, supra note 108, art. 17.
218. See Bridy, supra note 114, at 350 (reporting that it cost YouTube one hundred million
dollars to develop Content ID).
219. Spotify reported significant operating losses and negative cash flow as late as 2018.
At that time, Spotify, a service that was over a decade old, had reported revenue of $4.1 billion
but, because its royalty payments alone cost approximately three billion dollars, it reported an
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itself making eleven million euros in revenue per year could suddenly be
subjected to ten times that amount in copyright licensing and enforcement
costs.
Only the technology firms that are too big to fail, and only the technology
firms that can offset the high cost of copyright royalties with multiple other
product lines or immensely profitable ecosystems, will take on the
exorbitantly expensive, confusing, and time-consuming process of licensing
content. As one commentator noted about Article 17, “rightsholders’
concerns about YouTube’s clout are almost single-handedly driving an effort
to write into law a technical hurdle that would appear to make YouTube
almost singularly competition proof.”220 The overall end result will be a
market dominated by a select handful of firms, as upstarts who may otherwise
have come up with a new way to deliver content are either shut out of the
market, because it is simply too cost-prohibitive to enter, or are forced to sell
a business that can never turn a profit, leading exactly to the type of
acquisitions that neo-Brandeis-school antitrust scholars have criticized as
harming overall consumer welfare.221 If services like Spotify were
previously able to operate even at heavy losses, it was because they were
relying on venture capital cash.222 But there is reason to believe that as
investors become more wary of subsidizing unprofitable businesses, the new
economic environment will no longer reward risky business propositions like
Spotify.223
With further consolidation in the market due to higher licensing costs,
licensors’ fears that a handful of firms will be able to better dictate licensing
negotiations will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The current streaming
market is already seeing a consolidation of services as continuously
unprofitable ones exit or are acquired. Pandora was recently acquired by
Sirius XM.224 Live365, formerly a large internet webcaster, shut down its
overall operating loss of $378 million. It specifically warned investors that, if it could not
“successfully earn revenue at a rate that exceeds the operational costs, including royalty
expenses, associated with [its] Service, [it] will not be able to achieve or sustain profitability
or generate positive cash flow on a sustained basis.” Spotify, Registration Statement (Form F1), at 17 (Feb. 28, 2018).
220. See Wolfe, supra note 213, at 1173.
221. See WU, supra note 4, at 124.
222. See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, That Digital Music Service You Love Is a Terrible Business,
FORTUNE (July 1, 2016, 4:59 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/07/01/digital-music-business/
[https://perma.cc/F9SB-AX57].
223. See How Covid-19 Could Impact Startup Funding, CB INSIGHTS (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/coronavirus-startup-funding/ [https://perma.cc/MGD77TZW] (projecting the decline in private market funding in the first quarter of 2020 to be the
second steepest quarterly decline in the past ten years).
224. See Jem Aswad, Sirius XM Completes Acquisition of Pandora, VARIETY (Feb. 1, 2019,
9:43 AM), https://variety.com/2019/biz/news/sirius-xm-completes-acquisition-of-pandora1203125882/ [https://perma.cc/TK5K-6KCB]. Notably, Pandora’s royalty rates as a digital
service far outpace that of Sirius XM as a satellite service—50 percent as compared to Sirius
XM’s 15.5 percent. See Bobby Owsinski, Here’s Why the SiriusXM-Pandora Deal Makes So
Much Sense, FORBES (Oct. 6, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobbyowsinski/
2018/10/06/heres-why-the-siriusxm-pandora-deal-makes-so-much-sense/#50f77b472d31
[https://perma.cc/T3ZW-9N9T].
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service specifically due to increased sound recording royalties set by the
Copyright Royalty Board.225 Square, the mobile payment services company
owned by billionaire Twitter founder Jack Dorsey, completed its acquisition
of a majority stake in Tidal just earlier this year.226 As one industry watcher
put it, “[i]t would be a sign of an unhealthy market if the only remaining
digital music services are those owned by larger companies content to
subsidize their music subsidiaries while generating profit elsewhere in the
businesses.”227
2. Expensive Licenses Will Encourage Licensees to Innovate Around the
Problem
If companies do not exit the market due to untenably high royalty costs,
they will instead attempt to innovate around the problem—by reducing their
reliance on content licenses. Professors Kal Raustiala and Christopher
Sprigman, for example, have detailed how licensees have already begun to
innovate around the problem of high licensing costs by creating their own
content.228 Netflix and Amazon are acting as movie and television
production studios.229
Spotify is acting as a quasi-record label,
commissioning songs from unknown producers under fake names for a
fraction of the cost of other licensed content.230 If paying for content licenses
becomes a losing business proposition, then perhaps the only way forward
will be for licensees to head toward a future where no licenses are required
at all. The licensees will become the licensor—the content creator and the
distributor one and the same. By making content licenses more expensive,
and by requiring licenses for user-generated content, content holders may
enjoy greater profits in the short run—but at the risk of far fewer licenses in
the long run.

225. See Anna Washenko, Live365 Announces Shut-Down at the End of January, RADIO &
INTERNET NEWS (Jan. 21, 2016), https://rainnews.com/breaking-live365-announces-shutdown-at-the-end-of-january/ [https://perma.cc/DWK8-3GK2].
226. See Katherine Rosman, Square Acquires Majority of Tidal, Jay-Z’s Streaming Service,
in $297 Million Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/04/
business/media/tidal-square-jay-z-dorsey.html [https://perma.cc/H6XH-78AH].
227. Testimony of David B. Pakman ¶ 29, In re Determination of Rates and Terms for
Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), No. 16-CRB-0003-PR (2018–
2022).
228. See Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption:
Streaming and the Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555, 1585–87, 1597
(2020) (describing how Netflix struggled in the years before it began creating its own content,
due to high licensing costs—but ultimately emerged triumphant once it began to create its own
content, and describing how Spotify has every incentive to create its own content to reduce
the cost of licensing content from others).
229. See id. at 1586–87; Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon’s Bet on Original Video Is Converting
Viewers into Shoppers, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 15, 2018, 4:37 AM), https://venturebeat.com/
2018/03/15/amazons-bet-on-original-video-is-converting-viewers-into-shoppers
[https://perma.cc/3H3G-QRH3].
230. See Ben Sisario, While Some Cry ‘Fake,’ Spotify Sees No Need to Apologize, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/business/media/while-somecry-fake-spotify-sees-no-need-to-apologize.html [https://perma.cc/D8HM-G9NF].
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Throughout all of this consolidation in the market, consumers of culture
will ultimately suffer. The dominant platforms in the space, YouTube and
Facebook, will increasingly act as gatekeepers and censors instead, as they
are required to under Article 17, using content identification systems to
censor and filter out speech that may be identified by opaque computer
algorithms as infringing—even where they may be protected fair uses.231
Cultural production, increasingly controlled by a few consolidated players
and driven by algorithmic identification, will be self-reinforcing. Copyright
law, in its drive to punish big technology conglomerates, will simply create
bigger, even more pernicious, technology conglomerates—Disney on
streaming steroids.
It is noteworthy that, in justifying the decision to sell Fox’s entertainment
division to Disney, Fox explained that it was motivated by “fear, opportunity
and pragmatism.”232 The fear comes from—what else but the “[f]ear of the
seemingly bottomless wallets of Netflix, Amazon and possibly Apple to
spend on new shows.”233 In other words, as “Big Content” has argued, the
further consolidation of Big Content is necessary in order to fight Big Tech.
Our creative universe may soon look like Goliath v. Goliath, a handful of
large companies with infinite resources facing off against each other in some
quest for cultural domination. Our copyright law, if it rises to the
techno-pessimist challenge, will only further perpetuate this race to the
bottom.
B. Correcting the Creep
These days, the early optimism of “commons-based production”—
uploading GarageBand songs on YouTube and sharing mash-ups and memes
on social media—has given way to the deep pessimism that such naive belief
in the transformative power of what Professor Lawrence Lessig called “remix

231. See Sag, supra note 39, at 531 (noting that identifying protected speech such as parody
or criticism “involves the kind of contextual decisionmaking that is easy for humans but
difficult for algorithms”). That YouTube’s Content ID seems to work very well for
monetizing content doesn’t necessarily suggest other platforms—even enormously
sophisticated and wealthy ones—will be able to do the same. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL,
COPYRIGHT (WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW) 66 (2018). For example, music labels have
an incentive to keep content up on YouTube’s platforms rather than block it because
YouTube’s deals with labels allow labels to monetize each use. Yet, it is unclear if other
user-generated platforms like Facebook, for example, are even capable of paying based on
usage. Indeed, Facebook’s deals are rumored to be “flat fee” deals. This exacerbates the
filtering concern, for if labels are paid a flat fee up front rather than per use, they will have no
incentive to allow any individual use to stay up, rather than take it down. See Mark Mulligan,
Facebook Flat Fee Music Deals Have Future Implications, HYPEBOT (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2018/04/facebook-flat-fee-music-deals-have-futureimplications-mark-mulligan.html [https://perma.cc/S2J4-GWN2] (noting that Facebook’s
deals with the music industry are rumored to be, unlike YouTube’s deals, “blind” checks,
“advances that are not tied to any kind of usage reports from Facebook”).
232. Schwartz, supra note 190.
233. Id.
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culture”234 “proved perfectly compatible with the emergence of platforms,
including those like Google that offer much for free.”235
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that technology platforms
loosen corporate dominance over content creation, in turn allowing
individual creation to flourish outside of both the incentives-based structures
of copyright law and corporate architectures. Copyright scholars writing
twenty years ago had made this optimistic argument, predicting that new
technologies would create more diffuse networks of creation, shifting the
model of content production from a one-to-many model to a one-to-one
model.236 And despite how the technological landscape has evolved since
then—in many ways, for the worse, and in unforeseen ways—the prediction
and theory that the networked landscape promotes myriad creativity and
diversity of content has continued to prove true, over and over again. The
deep implications of this for copyright law—what it means for the studio
system and what it means for content holders’ continued insistence that, due
to corporations’ risk-taking and initial investments, it should be corporations
that are uniquely deserving of copyright’s benefits237—are profound and
meaningful independent of other socioeconomic and political critiques of the
networked landscape.
Consider a recent example. In 2019, an artist by the name of Lil Nas X
wrote a track under two minutes long titled “Old Town Road.” The song,
which defies genre categorization but which can perhaps best be described
as country-rap, had been quietly removed from the Billboard country charts
because it did not fit Billboard’s (that old gatekeeper of the traditional music
industry) definition of country music.238 But in the twenty-first century
world of streaming, industry support—in the form of advertising, or
234. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 14 (2008).
235. Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 1494.
236. See BENKLER, supra note 1, at 212–17 (noting that the internet lowers the cost of
becoming a speaker, or broadcaster, and lowers the cost of distribution, together
“fundamentally alter[ing] the capacity of individuals, acting alone or with others, to be active
participants in the public sphere as opposed to its passive readers, listeners, or viewers”);
LESSIG, supra note 234, at 28 (describing the shift from “Read-Only” culture, or, “a culture
less practiced in performance, or amateur creativity, and more comfortable (think: couch)
with simple consumption,” to “Read/Write” culture, where everyone is a creator); see also
Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 262 (2006) (arguing that digital architectures
“empower[] democratic cultural participation and usher[] in a ‘semiotic democracy’ in which
all individuals can ‘rip, mix, and burn’ culture”).
237. See Witness Statement of David Kokakis ¶ 12, In re Determination of Rates and
Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), No. 16-CRB-0003-PR
(2018–2022) [hereinafter Kokakis Witness Statement] (“The costs of the search for talented
songwriters is high, both in dollars and time. As we often sign songwriters at the earliest
stages in their careers, a significant percentage of the songwriters we sign have not yet
appeared on a commercially successful recording at the time of signing. Of course, signing
unproven talent carries substantial business risk, and some songwriters do not go on to
generate hits or significant revenue in their careers.”).
238. See Elias Leight, Lil Nas X’s ‘Old Town Road’ Was a Country Hit. Then Country
Changed Its Mind, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 26, 2019, 9:24 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/
music/music-features/lil-nas-x-old-town-road-810844/ [https://perma.cc/2A9X-6GFN].
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concerted “pushes” to amplify a song—hardly mattered. The song was a
viral sensation on the streaming platform TikTok, a neo-YouTube where
users can post short video clips set to music. The song relied on the hashtag
(that generator of virality) #yeehaw, which in turn launched thousands of
user-generated videos incorporating the song, ultimately resulting in tens of
millions of plays on TikTok, propelling the song to a record-breaking
nineteen weeks atop the Billboard charts.239 As industry magazine Rolling
Stone puts it:
That scene would be unimaginable 20 years ago, when radio and labels
worked together to make hits. Since artists needed those institutions to
become popular, it was easy to dictate certain paths to success—a country
hit came from a country label and earned support from country radio. But
now the music industry often scrambles to sign and endorse tracks like “Old
Town Road,” which have already erupted online. Hits are not initially
dependent on industry support, which means that for a brief, giddy moment,
some songs exist entirely outside of traditional commercial
categorization.240

A loose coalition of internet users, not the industry machine, had propelled
the song to success. Notably, Lil Nas X did not receive a record deal until
after his hit went viral. Undoubtedly, in an age before TikTok, it may well
be that industry executives would not have taken a chance on a young
country-rap musician. Indeed, the very genre itself defies convention.
The story of Lil Nas X, and so many others who have come before and
will undoubtedly come after him, leads to one of the most important points
about what new technologies have done, and continue to do, for content: by
substituting the judgment of the audience for the judgment of a professional
gatekeeper, new technologies challenge one of the very core assumptions
underlying copyright law. Artists who first strike it big on TikTok,
Bandcamp, YouTube, SoundCloud, and other types of new technology
platforms challenge—if not render completely obsolete—the very basic
bargain and premise underlying copyright law in critical ways. For one, these
artists often do not expect to be rewarded for their creations at all.241
Consider another case: in this example, the most popular artist of the new
decade, Billie Eilish.242 Eilish had uploaded a song that she recorded in her
239. See Andrew R. Chow, Lil Nas X Talks ‘Old Town Road’ and the Billboard
Controversy, TIME (Apr. 5, 2019, 9:42 AM), https://time.com/5561466/lil-nas-x-old-townroad-billboard/ [https://perma.cc/23VJ-3J8V].
240. Leight, supra note 238.
241. See NETANEL, supra note 177, at 86 (“The Internet and other digital technologies have
drastically reduced the cost of disseminating and creating cultural works. As a result, they
have spawned a vast sector of authors who do not rely on the copyright incentive (and, equally
important, do not rely on publishers who rely on the copyright incentive) to create and
disseminate original expression.” (emphasis added)).
242. See Charlie Harding, Billie Eilish, the Neo-Goth, Chart-Topping Teenage Pop Star,
Explained, VOX (Aug. 19, 2019, 6:34 PM), https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/4/18/
18412282/who-is-billie-eilish-explained-coachella-2019
[https://perma.cc/R46F-JNN6]
(describing Eilish as a “generational icon” and noting that her album was “one of 2019’s most
critically and commercially successful releases”).
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bedroom, “Ocean Eyes,” to the popular music-sharing, one-to-one (as I use
the term here, meaning an endless amount of content for an endless array of
tastes) platform SoundCloud.243 But she had only ever “intended for one
person to listen to it: her dance teacher. When she woke up the next day, the
song had gone viral.”244 There was no calculated quid-pro-quo under the
traditional copyright reasoning: I expend effort and time to create content
because I expect that the content will sell and I will, in turn, reap the
rewards.245 Eilish was simply just a teen, who, like so many teens, and like
Lil Nas X, was just messing around.
And, just like Lil Nas X, it was only after Eilish’s song became an internet
sensation that the major label record deal followed. Yet, large corporate
copyright holders justify the need for extended copyright protection by
pointing to both the high costs of “R&D”—in this case, scouting out new
artists and taking risks on unproven talent—and promotion after those new
artists are signed.246 In an age in which success comes first and the record
deal comes later, however, this justification is upended.247 Labels can sign
sure bets, thus eviscerating the “risky investments” rationale; further,
because the acts they sign are already well known with established fanbases,
the marketing and promotion justification for labels is also significantly
diminished.248 In that sense, the content industry is looking less like other
industries, such as venture capital or whaling, in which high returns are
justified because no one would take on such risks without the promise of
great rewards.249 By lowering both the costs of production, so that more and
more amateurs are creating viral hits, and the costs of distribution and
advertising, so that gatekeepers become less and less relevant, new
technologies, such as streaming, challenge the core assumptions underlying
why we need copyright law.250
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. Of course, the question of what incentivizes authors to create is one that has vexed
copyright scholars since the beginning of copyright. For an interesting account of the complex
and myriad reasons why individuals create, see JESSICA SIBLEY, THE EUREKA MYTH:
CREATORS, INNOVATORS AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015).
246. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
247. See NETANEL, supra note 177, at 86 (“[A]s we see on YouTube and other online sites,
peer recommendations, lists of user favorites, and other such word-of-mouth equivalents can
sometimes substitute for marketing, making amateur creations into popular hits with no
advertising expenditure whatsoever.”).
248. See Kokakis Witness Statement, supra note 237, ¶ 19 (describing how Universal
Music A&R executives now discover new talent by monitoring “a host of websites” and that
new talent is “frequently discover[ed]” on blogs).
249. See Nathan Heller, Is Venture Capital Worth the Risk?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/27/is-venture-capital-worth-the-risk
[https://perma.cc/SJR3-9QR3].
250. This is even more true in a world in which firms that have access to data have better
information about the likelihood of success of any given content. While this Article does not
take on how data—and who owns it, or how it is used—can affect justifications for more or
less copyright, my other work takes on the thorny question of whether the use of copyrighted
content to generate valuable data in fact dictates increased royalties to content owners in the
short run. See Xiyin Tang, Beyond Copyright (manuscript) (on file with author). Professors
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First, if we are heading toward a future where the biggest platforms
(Netflix, Amazon, Facebook), armed with artificial intelligence and
algorithms, can innovate around the problem of high third-party content costs
by creating their own content (Netflix Originals, Amazon Originals,
Facebook Watch), then we do not need copyright law to grant these entities
an even bigger reward in the form of a monopoly over that content. In
adjusting the rules of copyright in laws like the DSM, the prevailing narrative
has been one of “giv[ing] publishers and authors the means to negotiate better
with digital platforms.”251 Yet, this sympathetic public narrative focused on
remunerating individual authors and small publishers misses the big point:
today’s digital platform behemoths will be tomorrow’s publishers and
authors. In adjusting the rules to redistribute wealth today, we are only
setting the stage for wealthier technology platforms tomorrow.
Second, copyright has long been justified by appealing to incentives—in
the form of a monopoly over subsequent copies so the copyright owner can
recoup those first copy costs.252 But if we are to heed seriously concerns by
the content industry that their copyrighted content is increasingly being used
as a means to an end, as a way to lure users into their broader ecosystem—
Amazon uses Amazon Originals content to lure consumers onto the broader
Amazon platform, so they can sell more Prime subscriptions and in turn sell
more products; Apple uses Apple Music to sell more iPhones253—then our
new content creators (Apple, Amazon, Netflix) will not need the “carrots”
(incentives) of copyright law to create content at all. These technology firms
will create the content anyway because their business models are not reliant
on copyright’s system of rewards; the rewards come, rather, in the form of
more sales of iPhones or greater sales on Amazon’s consumer goods
platform.254 And in fact, if antitrust scholars are right, if some whittling away
of tech wealth is needed,255 copyright law can help—only by doing away
with copyright monopolies for our new tech content creators.
Third, not only will the new content creators not need copyright’s
incentives system, our new content creators will also not need the sticks: the
Raustiala and Sprigman have also recently published an excellent analysis on how data has
been harnessed to create content in the adult video market, speculating more broadly that “[i]f
those who can access the vast amounts of data streaming are better positioned to match the
content they create to existing market demand, we need less copyright to provide the same
level of creative incentive.” See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 228, at 1605.
251. Press Release, supra note 112.
252. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
253. See Expert Report of Marc Rysman, PhD., In re Determination of Rates and Terms
for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), No. 16-CRB-0003-PR
(2018–2022).
254. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 228, at 1614 (“What changes when content
becomes no longer the product but a loss leader or selective benefit that is really aimed at
securing the brand loyalty, patronage, and data of as many consumers as possible? In this
world, copyright protection is far less central, because content is far less central.”).
255. See WU, supra note 4, at 15 (“Most visible in our daily lives is the great power of the
tech platforms, especially Google, Facebook, and Amazon, who have gained extraordinary
power over our lives. With this centralization of private power has come a renewed
concentration of wealth, and a wide gap between the rich and poor.”).
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ability to assert infringement to control unauthorized distribution. Because
these creators are also the distributors, they can directly control how the
content is viewed, copied, and distributed. Gone are the days of the
middleman—Disney relying on movie theaters to distribute its content. The
distributor-creator is best situated to ensure that unauthorized copying by
third parties does not occur, through the implementation of rigorous access
controls and digital rights management tools.
If we are in fact heading toward a future where traditional copyright law
will matter less and less and other forms of governance—private ordering,
normative values, and technological controls—will take precedence, we must
also consider whether this evidences the insufficiency of traditional
copyright law and calls for a vastly new regulatory regime governing
creativity altogether. A world comprised mostly of private ordering is one
potentially fraught with peril, as it lies largely obscured behind the opaque
decision-making of powerful entities. Thinking “beyond copyright,” then,
ultimately means two dueling conceptions: one of the inadequacies of
current laws and one militating for its continued relevance through rebirth.
Despite the dubious lineage of the term “value gap,” the phrase has
persisted precisely because it raises serious questions about power—who has
it, how it can be wielded, and the deep inequalities created by the success of
companies like Google, Facebook, and Amazon. By concluding that
copyright law—a law premised in according broad, property-like, monopoly
rights over a work—will only result in greater, not less, inequality in the long
run, this Article does not mean to suggest that law itself is not up to the task.
One answer might simply be to look to other areas of the law to solve the
problems that laws like the DSM attempt to address. For example, the EU
already has an article in the Treaty of Rome prohibiting abuse of dominant
position, that is, prohibiting anticompetitive conduct by dominant entities
that cause harm to third parties that are economically dependent upon
them.256 The United States can look to this language in reshaping its own
antitrust laws if it determines that, for example, newspapers are dependent
on Google for the transmission of their stories and are suffering economic
harm as a direct result of a platform’s refusing to take out licenses. The
doctrine of dominant position, by its very nature, targets specific entities and
specific fact patterns—not all online platforms and general notions of
“bigness.”
Likewise, rather than reshaping the doctrine of fair use—to emphasize
factors such as commerciality (Big Tech’s excess profits) or lost licensing
revenue (if anyone can take out a license, Big Tech can)—in a way that would
adversely affect all users of copyrighted works, courts can instead create
better solutions tailored to individual technology companies, in the form of
256. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 82, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325)
(“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position . . . shall be prohibited
[including] . . . directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions; . . . [and] limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers . . . .”).
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supervising fair and equitable class action settlements, perhaps reached in
conjunction with legislative reform.257 On the other hand, fair use decisions,
even if the defendant beneficiary in that particular decision happens to be,
say, Google, have enormous trickle-down effects that could benefit
individual artists and individual creators in vastly different creative
contexts.258
CONCLUSION
Almost two decades ago, Professor James Boyle referred to various
developments in copyright laws—the lengthening of copyright’s terms, the
use of digital rights management tools—as a “second enclosure movement,”
an enclosure of the “intangible commons of the mind.”259 Yet, our new era’s
techno-pessimism, if left unchecked as it bleeds into our copyright laws, has
perfectly coincided with yet another enclosure movement, driven by the
neoclassicist belief that greater internalization by corporate entities who can
best maximize profits is the most efficient means of rights allocation.260 And
that third enclosure movement will come if we do not recognize that the path
we are on now—gutting safe harbor protection, removing fair and reasonable
licensing rates, whether done in the name of redistributive justice, retribution,
or punishment for the technology companies that have been labelled the new
“robber barons”261 of our digital age—leads inexorably to less cultural
production and less availability of content and greater entrenchment of power
in the same corporate conglomerates that have controlled the dissemination
and access to copyrighted goods since the beginning of time.
The strength of the safe harbor laws, on the other hand, was to loosen the
grip of the old gatekeepers and create more diffuse networks of creation.262
And, as Professor Jack Balkin had argued back when the internet was a purer
version of its current self, this form of cultural participation is democratic—
not in the second order, not as somehow subordinate to or “less than” political
speech or exercising the right to vote, but constitutes the very core of a fully
participatory democracy because creating and recreating culture gets at the
257. See Xiyin Tang, A History and Theory of Copyright Class Actions and
Licensing-by-Litigation (working draft) (on file with author).
258. For example, the recent decision in favor of Google in Oracle America, Inc., has
already been cited in an amicus brief before the Second Circuit in a case arguing for a
rehearing of a recent case holding that the artist Andy Warhol did not make fair use of a
photographer’s work. See Brief of Amici Curiae 60 Intellectual Property Scholars in Support
of Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc 1, Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual
Arts v. Goldsmith, 11 F. 4th 26 (2d Cir. 2021) (No. 19-CV-2420), 2021 WL 1737580 (arguing
that the Second Circuit’s denial of fair use conflicts with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Oracle
America, Inc.).
259. Boyle, supra note 132, at 37.
260. See Xiyin Tang, Privatizing Copyright (working draft) (on file with author).
261. WU, supra note 4.
262. Nor do I believe that this form of democratization merely shifted control from
traditional media to a single new dominant platform, Google. As evidenced by the meteoric
rise and incredible popularity of new sites like TikTok and Twitch, it would be folly to assume
that the diffuse network of (mostly very young) creators today will be locked in to a single
platform for time immemorial. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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very root of who we are, by defining what it means to be human, as an
expression of our truest selves.263
Of course, as with all things, the true nature of what the internet has
evolved to become is much more complicated. Copyright law, in its current
form, is unequipped to grapple with the immense challenges that the new
platform dominance has wrought. Amidst all this, we would do well to
remember, as technology reporter Rachel Botsman writes, that the “new
digital world” is still “a work in progress . . . . Perhaps the present danger is
that in our rush to condemn the corruption of digital technologies, we will
unfairly condemn the technologies themselves.”264 And perhaps, in this rush,
we will mistakenly drive cultural production back into the dark ages, back
into the cave, unwittingly sending power back to the consolidated few, back
to ever-looping Top 40s, back to films populated by nice attractive white
folks, back to a world ruled over by Disney, Universal, Sony, Warner—
because in this rush to condemn the internet, we have forgotten that, in the
storybook of creativity and copyright, the narrative is altogether very, very
different.

263. Balkin, supra note 106, at 33 (“[T]he forces of democratization operate not only
through regular elections, but through changes in institutions, practices, customs, mannerisms,
speech, and dress. A ‘democratic’ culture, then, means much more than democracy as a form
of self-governance . . . . What makes a culture democratic, then, is not democratic governance
but democratic participation . . . . A democratic culture is the culture of a democratized
society; a democratic culture is a participatory culture.”).
264. Rachel Botsman, Dawn of the Techlash, GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/11/dawn-of-the-techlash
[https://perma.cc/7PAA-NYYN].

